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Contingent Capital in European Union
Bank Restructuring
Christoph K. Henkel * and Wulf A. Kaal **
Abstract: The uncoordinated reorganization and resolution of Systemically
Important Financial Institutions in different countries pose many challenges.
Contingent capital provides a viable alternative for the efficient restructuring
and resolution of failing financial institutions. Contingent Capital provides a
mechanism for internalizing banks’ failure costs and helps return distressed
financial institutions to solvency. This article offers a comparative perspective
on bank resolution and restructuring in the European Union, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and Germany and shows that Contingent Capital could play a
substantial role in bank restructuring.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At the height of the financial crisis, many countries saw no alternative
to bailing out some of their most prominent financial institutions.1
Governments perceived the winding down of banks through the national
channels of insolvency as the least favorable course of action. 2 Defaulting
to insolvency could have further deteriorated market confidence in the
affected financial institutions and could have triggered bank runs3 and panic
in financial markets. 4 Some countries had no statutory regime to deal with
bank failures or lacked a regulatory basis for public bail-outs. 5 To address
these shortcomings, many countries hastily enacted laws 6 without regard to
1

DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL – UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 19–40 (2011); Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter,
Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard: Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and
Officers Liability for Taking Excessive Risk in Germany and the United States, 40 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1433 (2010).
2
See, e.g., Gunnar Schuster & Lars Westpfahl, Neue Wege Zur Banksanierung – Ein
Beitrag zum Restrukturierungsgesetz (Teil I), Der Betrieb, DB 2011, 221. Contra SKEEL,
supra note 1, at 158–73 (arguing that reliance on insolvency regimes would have been
preferable). Also, the availability of public bail-out money may have removed the threat of
losses, which made insolvency a theoretical threat at best.
3
See, e.g., Marianne Barriaux, Market Forces: Banking Sector Hit by Northern Rock
Fallout, GUARDIAN, Sept. 14, 2007, (Guardian Financial Pages), at 40.
4
James B. Thomson, On Systemically Important Financial Institutions And Progressive
Systemic Mitigation, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 135 (2010).
5
See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
6
U.S. Scholars have referred to recent regulatory measures such as Sarbanes Oxley and
the Dodd-Frank Act as Quack Corporate Governance. See Roberta Romano, The SarbanesOxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd–Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95
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international commitments, consistency, and coordination. 7
Policy makers and legislators across the globe agree that avoiding a
repeat of the financial crisis is one of the most important legislative
objectives. 8 The United States Congress enacted The Dodd-Frank Act, 9
and the European Commission proposed various regulatory schemes to
address many of these problems. 10 A primary focus of these initiatives

MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2010–11).
7
See Grp. of Twenty [G20], The London Summit: Leaders’ Statement, ¶ 2 (April 2,
2009), available at http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocuments/
Highlights/G20_Final_London_Communique.pdf (G20 London Summit); G20, Declaration
on the Strengthening the Financial System (April 2, 2009), available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/g20_summit/2009-1/annex2.html (G20 London
Summit) [hereinafter G20 London]; Thorsten Höche, Das Restrukturierungsgesetz – Neue
Wege in der Bankenaufsicht (mit Seitenblicken auf die Schweiz und das Vereinigte
Königreich) [The Restructuring Act – New Ways of Banking Supervision (with side views
of Switzerland and the United Kingdom)]; WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN: ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
WIRTSCHAFTS UND BANKRECHT 49 (2011) (Ger.); see Hans-Jürgen A. Fezerabend, Stephan
Behnes, & Marcus Helios, Einleitung zum Restrukturierungsgesetz, Der Betrieb, DB 2011,
Supplement No. 4, 5 (explaining the German enactment of various emergency acts following
the Hypo Real failure in Germany).
8
For example, during a press conference introducing the European Commission’s latest
proposal to revise capital requirements for European banks, the Internal Market
Commissioner Michel Barnier said: “The financial crisis has hit European families and
businesses hard. We cannot let such a crisis occur again and we cannot allow the actions of a
few in the financial world to jeopardize our prosperity.” Press Release, European Comm’n,
Commission Wants Stronger and More Responsible Banks in Europe IP/11/915 (Jul 20,
2011) (on file with Europa), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference= IP/11/915&format=HTML&aged0&language=en&guiLanguage=en [hereinafter
IP/11/915]. On a more global level, the G20 Summit Leaders conveyed a commitment to
address the crisis through international cooperation and harmonization expressing a similar
sentiment at the end of the G20 Summit in Pittsburgh in 2009. The Leaders’ Statement notes
that the G20 members agree “we should develop resolution tools and frameworks for the
effective resolution of financial groups to help mitigate the disruption of financial institution
failures and reduce moral hazard in the future.” G20, Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh
Summit, ¶ 13 (Sept. 24–25, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_20102014/president/pdf/statement_ 20090826_en_2.pdf.
9
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, §§ 201–17, 124 Stat. 1376, 1442–1520 (2010).
10
DG Internal Mkt. and Serv., Technical Details of a Possible EU Framework for Bank
Recovery and Resolution 7–10, (unpublished working document), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2011/crisis_management/consultation
_paper_en.pdf [hereinafter DG Working Document]; Commission Proposal for a Regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council on Prudential Requirements for Credit
Institutions and Investment Firms, at 10, COM (2011) 452 final (July 20, 2011) [hereinafter
CRD IV Regulation]; Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
the Council on the Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and
Amending Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions, Insurance Undertakings and Investment
Firms in a Financial Conglomerate, COM (2011) 453 final (July 20, 2011) [hereinafter
CRD IV Directive].
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involved the establishment of a supervisory regime for more efficient
regulatory oversight, 11 early intervention, and early resolution to minimize
the risk of contagion and to protect public funds. 12 Germany revised a
substantial portion of its banking laws. 13 Spain changed its regulatory
scheme for orderly bank restructuring. 14 Many other European countries
including the United Kingdom 15 and Switzerland similarly adjusted their
laws. 16
At the international level, the focus of cooperation shifted from
corporate governance reform in a general sense toward reform of
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). 17 In light of this shift
in international cooperation and given the trend toward diverging national
rules, regulatory arbitrage could become a risk for the competitiveness and
stability of financial markets. This could especially hold true if countries
cannot achieve a minimal level of convergence of international banking
resolution and restructuring regimes. 18 The European Commission has
recognized the threat of regulatory arbitrage and conducted an impact
assessment of harmonization in the context of revisions to the capital
requirements for banks. 19 The Commission concluded that maximum
harmonization with some exceptions would allow the European Union to
reduce compliance burdens, ensure a level playing field, create legal
certainty, and achieve supervisory convergence. 20
Convergence could be especially important for resolution regimes.
The uncoordinated reorganization and resolution of SIFIs, subject to

11
See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and
the European Central Bank, COM (2010) 579 final (Nov. 20, 2010) [hereinafter COM
(2010) 579 final]; see also infra Part II.
12
DG Working Document, supra note 10; see also Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376.
13
See infra note 296 and accompanying text.
14
B.O.E. 2009, 155 (Spain), amended by B.O.E. 2011, 43 (Spain).
15
INDEP. COMM’N ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT CONSULTATION ON REFORM OPTIONS,
INTERMIN REPORT, 2011, at 1 (U.K.).
16
See Westpfahl, infra note 243 and accompanying text.
17
See infra note 63 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Höche, supra note 7.
18
Peter Spiegel, EU warns US to speed up bank reform, FIN. TIMES, June 1, 2011,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cc0e7382-8bcb-11e0-854c-00144feab49a.html#axzz1a
VbBDBPq. The European Union Internal Market Commissioner Michel Barnier has even
gone so far as to accuse the United States of “leav[ing] too much latitude for financial
institutions,” allowing financial institutions to “circumvent globally-agreed principles.” Id.
In his letter to Treasury Secretary Geithner, Commissioner Barnier also called upon the
United States to limit bonuses and pension payments for U.S. bankers, which he believes is
essential to limiting incentives for U.S. headquartered bank executives to continue to take
excessive risk. Id.
19
CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, at 5.
20
Id.
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multiple resolution regimes in different countries, could undermine their
operation as a conglomerate and going concern. Without coordination and
convergence, it is possible that a SIFI with operations in multiple countries
could petition for reorganization under German law, for instance, and
emerge as a more competitive and leaner business while the same SIFI in
the United States may be liquidated under the Boxer Amendment of the
Dodd-Frank Act. 21 The European Commission’s objective of creating
maximum harmonization through a global “single rule book” 22 may not be
feasible. However, setting up a legal framework for private ordering in the
context of contingent capital 23 could provide an adequate level of
convergence and at least help ensure a level playing field.
Contingent capital is the predefined conversion of a financial
institution’s debt securities into equity securities. 24 Contingent capital
provides an option for the efficient restructuring and resolution of failing
financial institutions. It could enable a SIFI to return to solvency, prevent
financial contagion, and maintain overall financial stability.25 It could offer
an efficient mechanism for reorganizing SIFIs in jurisdictions that focus
merely on liquidation rather than reorganization. 26
Recent developments in Europe suggest that contingent capital will
play a prominent role as part of capital requirements for banks in

21

Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 214, 124 Stat. 1376, 1442–1520 (2010).
Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment, at 5, SEC (2011) 949 final (July
20, 2011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2011:
0949:FIN:EN:PDF.
23
See, e.g., BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN [BANKG] [FEDERAL LAW
ON BANKS, SAVING AND LOANS] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952, art. 9(d) (Switz.), available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf; see also supra art. 9, 11, 13.
24
For purposes of this article, the term “contingent capital” or “contingent capital
securities” (CCS) will be used. Another name for the same concept is contingent
convertibles (short CoCos). Contingent Capital: CoCo Nuts, ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 2009,
http://www. economist.com/node/ 14816673?story_id=14816673; Squam Lake Working
Grp. on Fin. Regulation, An Expedited Resolution Mechanism for Distressed Financial
Firms: Regulatory Hybrid Securities, 2 (Council on Foreign Relations: Center for
Geoeconomic Studies, Working Paper, 2009); MARK J. FLANNERY, STABILIZING LARGE
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS WITH CONTINGENT CAPITAL CERTIFICATES (2009); Julie Dickson,
Superintendant, Fin. Inst. Can., Remarks at Financial Services Invitational Forum, Economic
and Financial Turmoil: Are There Lesson for Boards? (May 6, 2010).
25
DG Working Document, supra note 10, at Annex I.
26
It is important to note, however, that while contingent capital may help stabilize large
financial firms, it may not help to avoid an economic crisis in every case. See FLANNERY,
supra note 24; John C. Coffee, Systemic Risk after Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the
Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 833 (2011) (“If
a firm’s variable costs clearly exceed its revenues, and no turnaround is in sight, the firm will
not be saved by converting its bonds into preferred stock. . . . [R]esolution authority
provides the superior mechanism for its liquidation. Thus, the boundaries within which
contingent capital can feasibly work are set by the firm’s ability to recover its variable
costs.”).
22
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Switzerland 27 and throughout the European Union. 28 The European
Commission has proposed various models of contingent capital and broadly
distinguished between a comprehensive and targeted approach as a writedown tool allowing restructuring and resolution of financial institutions.29
The targeted approach provides a tool for the write down and conversion of
financial institutions’ liabilities. The targeted approach could provide
resolution authorities with additional flexibility if a failing institution
cannot be wound up under the respective national insolvency regime. 30
The European Commission promulgated a new approach in a
directive 31 and regulation 32 proposal implementing Basel III and revising
the capital requirement rules in the European Union. The Commission
recognizes contingent capital as a so-called “Additional Tier 1
instrument,” 33 subject to full and permanent write down at the point of nonviability. 34 The European Union-wide recognition of contingent capital as
Tier 1 capital may further incentivize national governments to promulgate
contingent capital standards. The Commission proposal leaves sufficient
discretion for national legislators to implement their own contingent capital
standards. The German government has proposed a change to the German
Corporation Act to implement provisions for contingent capital. 35 The
Swiss and English legislators have taken similar approaches. In the United
States, the Dodd-Frank Act mandates a study on the feasibility of
contingent capital. 36
27

See, e.g., BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN [BANKG] [FEDERAL LAW
BANKS, SAVING AND LOANS] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952, art. 9(d) (Switz.), available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf; Press Release, Fed. Dep’t of Fin.,
Strengthening Financial Sector Stability (too big to fail) (July 12, 2011),
http://www.efd.admin.
ch/dokumentation/zahlen/00579/00607/02255/index.html?lang=en
[hereinafter Fed. Dep’t of Fin. Press Release].
28
See DG Working Document, supra note 10; see CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10;
see CRD IV Directive, supra note 10.
29
DG Working Document, supra note 10, at 87–89.
30
Id. at 86.
31
CRD IV Directive, supra note 10.
32
CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10.
33
Id. art. 49(1)(n).
34
Id. at 20 (“(27) In line with the decision of the BCBS [the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision], as endorsed by the GHOS [Central Bank Governors and Heads of
Supervision] on 10 January 2011, all Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments of an
institution should be fully and permanently written down or converted fully into Common
Equity Tier 1 capital at the point of non-viability of the institution.”).
35
Referentenentwurf des Bundesministeriums der Justiz, Gesetz zur Änderung des
Aktiengesetzes, available at http://www2.nwb.de/portal/content/ir/downloads/217907/RefE_
Aktienrechtsnovelle_2011.pdf?referrer=www.google.com (April 14, 2011).
36
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 115, 124 Stat. 1376, 1404 (2010).
ON

(c) CONTINGENT CAPITAL.— (1) STUDY REQUIRED.—The Council shall
conduct a study of the feasibility, benefits, costs, and structure of a contingent

196

Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring
32:191 (2012)

This article provides an overview of regulatory proposals for the
restructuring of financial institutions and explains the role contingent
capital may play in this context. We point out pertinent issues that require
resolution before regulatory proposals may be implemented. We also
suggest possible approaches for some of the open issues by providing a
comparative perspective of the European Union and national approaches.
The first part of this article briefly examines international initiatives on the
subject of bank recovery and resolution. The second part reviews the
actions taken by the European Union and national legislators in
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Germany. The third part discusses
contingent capital in European bank restructuring. The fourth part
evaluates contingent capital as both a preventative tool in European bank
restructuring and as a part of bank recovery and resolution. In the final part,
we consider triggers and other design features of contingent capital, identify
problems, and suggest possible solutions. We emphasize the possible role
of international convergence.
II. INTERNATIONAL MITIGATION INITIATIVES, RESOLUTION
TOOLS AND FRAMEWORKS
The discussion of the European approach to bank recovery and
resolution would not be complete without considering some of the
international initiatives taken since the financial crisis. As in most
countries affected by the financial crisis, European nations first attempted to
deal with the results of the crisis at national levels. However, as many bank
failures, such as Lehman Brothers, 37 Fortis, 38 Icelandic banks, 39 Northern
capital requirement for nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of
Governors and bank holding companies described in subsection (a), which study
shall include—
(A) an evaluation of the degree to which such requirement would enhance the
safety and soundness of companies subject to the requirement, promote the
financial stability of the United States, and reduce risks to United States taxpayers;
(B) an evaluation of the characteristics and amounts of contingent capital that
should be required;
(C) an analysis of potential prudential standards that should be used to determine
whether the contingent capital of a company would be converted to equity in times
of financial stress;
(D) an evaluation of the costs to companies, the effects on the structure and
operation of credit and other financial markets, and other economic effects of
requiring contingent capital;
(E) an evaluation of the effects of such requirement on the international
competitiveness of companies subject to the requirement and the prospects for
international coordination in establishing such requirement; and
(F) recommendations for implementing regulations.
Id.
37

US Banking Crisis Financiers Have Put the World at Risk, HERALD (Glasgow), Sept.
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Rock, 40 or Hypo Real Estate Holding 41 have demonstrated, national
measures proved ineffective and failed to address cross-border banking
operations or contagion. 42 In addition, national measures varied greatly. 43
Most national measures took the form of public bail-outs without broad
international consensus, 44 thereby increasing the threat of international
regulatory arbitrage as well as negatively impacting the global
competitiveness of national financial markets. 45
The 2009 G20 Summits in London 46 and Pittsburgh 47 were the first
international response with the goal of coordinating policy actions at an
international level. Following the G20 Summit, the third Basel Accord
established the Basel III requirements. 48 Since the 2010 G20 Summit in
Seoul, the international focus has shifted toward addressing the risk that

16, 2008, at 14.
38
Ian Traynor, Belgium Acts to Prevent Financial Group’s Collapse: Governments
Agree to Pour Euros 11bn into Fortis, GUARDIAN, Sept. 29, 2008, (Guardian Financial
Pages), at 26.
39
Yves Smith, The first casualty of the crisis: Iceland, NAKED CAPITALISM (Nov. 12,
2008), www.nakedcapitalism.com/2008/11/first-casualty-of-crisis-iceland.html.
40
Marianne Barriaux, Market Forces: Banking Sector Hit by Northern Rock Fallout,
GUARDIAN, Sept. 15, 2007, (Guardian Financial Pages), at 40.
41
Carter Dougherty et al., Financial Crises Spread in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008,
at A1.
42
DG Working Document, supra note 10.
43
During the crisis many countries introduced emergency laws to establish some existing
legal basis for state aid to national and global systemically important financial institutions.
See, e.g., the approach taken in Germany by enacting the Financial Market Stabilization
Law, Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz [FMStG], Oct. 17, 2008, BGBL. I at 1982; The
Amended Financial Market Stabilization Law, Finanzmarktstabilisierungsergänzungsgesetz
[FMStErgG], Apr. 7, 2009, BGBL. I at 725; Law to Improve the Financial Market and
Insurance Regulatory Authority, Gesetz zur Stärkung der Finanzmarkt und der
Versicherungsaufsicht [FMVAStärkG], July 29, 2009, BGBL. I at 2305.
44
Sharon E. Foster, Too Big to Fail, Too Small to Compete: Systemic Risk Should be
Addressed Through Antitrust Law, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 31, 33, 49 (2010).
45
In the European Union, until the fall of 2010, state aid to support banks amounted to as
much as 13% GDP. See Press Release, European Comm’n, An EU Framework for Crisis
Management in the Financial Sector, Memo/10/506 (Oct. 20, 2010), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/506&format=HTML&
aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
46
See G20 London, supra note 7; see Höche, supra note 7; see Fezerabend et al., supra
note 7.
47
G20, Pittsburgh Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy (Sept. 15,
2009) [hereinafter Pittsburgh Summit]. In Pittsburgh, the leaders agreed that they “should
develop resolution tools and frameworks for the effective resolution of financial groups to
help mitigate the disruption of financial institution failures and reduce moral hazard in the
future.” Pittsburgh Summit, supra, ¶ 13.
48
Bank for Int’l Settlements [BIS], Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Consultative
Document: Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks & Banking
Systems, (Dec. 2010, rev. June 2011) [hereinafter BIS III].

198

Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring
32:191 (2012)

SIFIs pose to global financial markets.
At the London and Pittsburgh Summit the leaders of the G20 also
charged the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 49 with presenting
recommendations for the development of this framework. 50 The FSB
submitted its first major report to the G20 in the fall of 2010 51 and
recommended the implementation of internationally consistent bank capital
and liquidity standards based on the third Basel Accord. 52 The FSB further
proposed the increase of supervision and regulatory measures to deal with
SIFIs. As part of a new regulatory regime, the FSB also suggested the
requirement of higher loss absorbency measures for SIFIs that reflect the
higher risk that these financial institutions might pose to the global financial
system. 53 Finally, the FSB report addressed a needed reform of the OTC
derivative markets 54 and proposed the general increase in supervisory
intensity and effectiveness of all financial markets. 55
The G20 leaders followed the FSB recommendations and endorsed the
Basel III requirements at the Seoul Summit in November 2010. 56 All G20
members have since agreed to implement Basel III. The goal is to
implement national legislation by January 1, 2013, with an enforcement
date of January 1, 2019. 57 Basel III introduces new capital and liquidity
standards and applies to all G20 banks. 58 Basel III specifically attempts to
prevent banks from using off-balance sheet vehicles and risk weighting

49
Financial Stability Board [FSB], http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/.
The
Financial Stability Board is an international body that has been established to coordinate the
work of national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies. The FSB
develops and promotes the implementation of effective regulatory and supervisory policies
for the financial sector. Members of the FSB are national regulatory authorities, national and
international financial institutions, associations, committees, and experts in the financial
sector. For a list of members, see http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/members/links.htm.
50
Pittsburgh Summit, supra note 47, ¶ 13.
51
Fin. Stability Bd., Progress Since the Washington Summit in the Implementation of the
G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability: Report of the Financial
Stability Board to G20 Leaders, (Nov. 8, 2010), 1–12, http://www.financialstabilityboard.
org/ publications/r_101111b.pdf.
52
Id. at 3–5.
53
Id. at 6–7.
54
Id. at 12–15.
55
Id. at 15–20.
56
Grp. Of Twenty [G20], Leaders’ Declaration: The Seoul Summit, at ¶ 13 (Nov. 11–12,
2010), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/11/seoulsummit_declaration.pdf
[hereinafter G20 Seoul Summit].
57
Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening
Financial Stability: Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors, Fin. Stability Bd. (Apr. 10, 2011), at 1, http://www.financial
stabilityboard.org/publications/r_110415a.pdf.
58
Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389,
439 (2011).
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methods to hide the true size of their balance sheet. 59 At its core, Basel III
establishes the following capital ratio requirements: (1) tier 1 capital 6%,
(2) common equity 4.5%, and (3) total capital 8%. 60 More importantly, the
Basel Accord establishes the requirement of capital conservation buffers to
be drawn upon during a financial crisis. 61 Under Basel II, the total capital
requirement for banks were merely 8%, i.e., 2% common equity tier 1
capital, 2 % other qualifying tier 1 capital, and 4% tier 2 capital. Starting in
2019, banks will be required to hold a total common equity plus
conservation buffers of 7% amounting to a total capital plus conservation
buffer of 10.5%. 62 Adding countercyclical buffers of up to 2.5 % and SIFI
capital surcharges, the total capital required under Basel III could reach
around 13%.
Since the endorsement of the Basel Accord and following the
recommendations of the FSB, international attention seems to have shifted
away from the international coordination of national bank resolution
regimes toward regulating systemically important financial institutions. 63
Early in 2011, at the Paris meeting of the G20 finance ministers and central
bank governors, the group agreed to focus on systemically important
financial institutions of significance for the global financial markets (GSIFIs) as opposed to financial institutions of significance only in their
respective home countries and identified a number of issues to work on. 64
The group identified the classification of G-SIFIs as well as the need
for a comprehensive multi-tiered framework with more supervisory
oversight and a more effective cross border resolution regime as the most
important issues to address. 65 As part of a viable resolution regime for GSIFIs, the group considered the possibility of capital surcharges, contingent
capital, and bail-in instruments as statutory write-down tools within
resolution and systemic levies. 66 To expedite the work on G-SIFIs, the

59

Id. at 444.
Id.
61
Id. at 446.
62
Id.
63
See, e.g., Höche, supra note7.
64
G20, Communiqué, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors,
February 18–19, 2011, ¶ 6, http://www.g20.org/pub_communiques.aspx (last visited July 18,
2011) (Paris) [hereinafter G20]. G-SIFIs are global systemically important financial
institutions as opposed to regional or national systemically important financial institutions.
For example, the two biggest Swiss banks, UBS and Credit Swiss, are both global players,
while at the same time being Switzerland’s biggest banks. Conversely, Japan, on a national
level, has various systemically important financial institutions, but these Japanese banks are
not of similar global significance. See, e.g., Patrick Jenkins, G20 Draws Up Two Tier Bank
Plan, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ff3f3a4a-ec46-11df-9e1100144feab49a.html#axzz1aQH71R8b.
65
G20, supra note 64, ¶ 6.
66
Id.
60
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group asked the FSB to deliver first recommendations on G-SIFI
classification and loss absorbency before the G20 summit in the fall of
2011. 67 The preliminary factors established to categorize G-SIFIs, which
may also include insurers, are (1) global activities, (2) size, (3)
interconnectedness, (4) substitutability and (5) complexity. 68 In addition, as
an alternative to the requirement of higher loss absorbency capacity, the
FSB considered a combination of capital surcharges and “bail-inables”. 69
In the context of bank resolution tools and regimes, the FSB has also set up
a Bail-in Working Group, which is reviewing technical aspects and
financial stability implications of both contractual and statutory bail-in
instruments and mechanisms. 70 The FSB published a consultation paper on
bank resolution of SIFIs in July 2011. 71
III. EUROPEAN BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION
The European Union initiated a number of long- and short-term
initiatives since the financial crisis. 72 Most of the initiatives were aimed at
specific areas of concern that required immediate attention. One example is
the European Union deposit guarantee scheme. 73 The long-term initiatives
were aimed at establishing a more comprehensive response to the financial
crisis. The initiatives included establishing an effective European System
of Financial Supervisors, 74 the European Union framework for crisis
management in the financial sector 75 and revision of the Capital
Requirements Directive (CRD IV). 76
67

FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 57, at 2.
Id.
69
Id. at 2.
70
Id. at 3.
71
Fin. Stability Bd., Consultative Document, Effective Resolution of Systemically
Important Financial Institutions: Recommendations and Timelines, (July 19, 2011),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110719.pdf.; Fin. Stability Bd.,
Comments Received on the FSB Consultative Document on Effective Resolution of SIFIs,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/c_110909.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
72
The sovereign debt crisis in Europe is not the focus of this paper. Although clearly
related to the financial crisis and public bank bail-outs, a comprehensive discussion of the
issues and latest developments related to the sovereign debt crisis of Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, and the actions taken by the European Union and IMF would go far beyond the
focus of this paper. As such, we will also not discuss the European Financial Stability
Facility (ESFS) or the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
73
Council Directive 2009/14, 2009 O.J. (L 68) 3 (EU).
74
Council Regulation 1092/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 1; Council Regulation 1093/2010,
2010 O.J. (L 331) 12; Council Regulation 1094/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 48; Council
Regulation 1095/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 84.
75
COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11.
76
See, e.g., European Commission, Possible Further Changes to the Capital
Requirements Directive, at 1–2 (Comm’n Services, Working Staff Paper, 2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/crd4/consultation_paper_en.pdf
68
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A. European Union Initiatives
As one of its first initiatives, the European Union amended the Deposit
Guarantee Schemes Directive 2009/14/EC in the spring of 2009. 77 The goal
of the amendment was to restore consumer confidence and protection after
the turmoil of the crisis. 78 The directive applies to all credit institutions in
the European Union and requires all institutions to join a Deposit Guarantee
Scheme (DGS). 79 Member States are required to ensure that all bank
deposits are secured at 100.000 euro, 80 which is an increase of 80.000 euro
over prior Union requirements. 81 In addition, a coverage payout cannot be
delayed for more than 20 working days. 82 Deposit guarantee schemes are
further required to be regularly supervised and must perform stress tests. 83
Following the findings of the de Larosiere Report, 84 the European
Commission also adopted a recommendation on remuneration in the
financial services sector 85 and a recommendation on directors’ pay. 86 With
a view towards long-term profitability and performance, the Commission
suggested that Member States regulate remuneration of risk-taking staff and
seek a balance between core pay and bonuses. 87 The Commission also

[hereinafter Comm’n Services].
77
Council Directive 2009/14, 2009 O.J. (L 68) 3 (EU).
78
Press Release, European Commission, Commission Proposes Package to Boost
Consumer Protection and Confidence in Financial Services (July 12, 2010), http://ec.europa.
eu/internal_market/bank/guarantee/index_en.htm.
79
Council Directive 94/19, art. 3, 1994 O.J. (L 35) 5, 8. However, deposits other than
consumer deposits, such as deposits of financial institutions, public authorities, structured
investment products, and debt certificates are now specifically excluded from coverage; see
also Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Deposit Guarantee Schemes at 2, 6–9 COM (2010) 368 final (July 12, 2010).
80
See Council Directive, supra note 81, at art. 1(a).
81
Id. pmbl. ¶ 3.
82
Id. pmbl. ¶ 10.
83
Id. pmbl. ¶ 6.
84
The de Larosière Grp., The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU,
Brussels, at 31 (Feb. 25, 2009) (chaired by Jacques de Larosière), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf
[hereinafter
The de Larosière Grp.]. The de Larosière Group was a group of experts asked by the
European Commission to provide advice on the future of European financial regulation and
supervision. The work of the group resulted in the so-called de Larosière Report. Members
of the group were Jacques de Larosière, Leszek Balcerowicz, Otmar Issing, Rainer Masera,
Callum McCarthy, Lars Nyberg, José Pérez, and Onno Ruding.
85
Press Release, European Commission, Financial Services Sector Pay: Commission Set
Out Remuneration of Risk-Taking Staff in Financial Institutions (Apr. 29, 2009),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/674
[hereinafter
Press
Release]; Commission Recommendation On Remuneration Policies in the Financial
Services Sector, C(2009) 3159 (Apr. 30, 2009).
86
See Press Release, supra note 85; see also Council Directive 2011/61, 2011 O.J. (L
174) 1, 70 (EC).
87
Kaal, supra note 58, at 401; Press Release, supra note 85.
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deemed a claw-back option for bonuses a necessary requirement 88 and
asked that Member States make remuneration policies transparent for all
parties involved. 89 Similar recommendations followed for directors’ pay,
including a limit on golden parachutes and a ban on severance pay in case
of failure. 90
Another important European Union initiative was the adoption of
Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM). 91
After an initial proposal in the spring of 2009, the directive went into force
on July 21, 2011. The AIFM sector in the European Union, which
represented assets of around 2 trillion euro at the end of 2008, includes
hedge funds, private equity funds, and commodity funds, among others. 92
The directive regulates AIFM and applies to funds managing 100 million
euros or more. 93 Some estimates suggest that this applies to 90% of assets
managed by hedge funds domiciled in the European Union. 94 The directive
regulates all major sources of risk of AFIM, 95 includes various transparency
rules, 96 and sets corporate governance standards on how to manage risk,
liquidity, and conflicts of interest. 97 Finally, the directive aims to establish
a passport regime with a transitional period of three years for non-EU hedge
funds in order to perform management and marketing activities in the
European Union. 98
B. Long-Term Initiatives of the European Union
Among the most important long-term initiatives are the establishment
of a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) 99 and the
88
Press Release, supra note 85; see also Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu,
Economics, Politics, and the International Principles for Sound Compensation, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 431, 477 (2011).
89
Press Release, supra note 85.
90
Press Release, supra note 85; Communication from the Commission accompanying
Commission Recommendation complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and
2005/162/EC, COM (2009) 211 final (April 30, 2009).
91
Council Directive 2011/61, supra note 86, at 1. For a critical assessment, see Kaal,
supra note 58, at 396–97 (assessing the influence of the Directive on the alternative
investment community’s competitiveness and suggesting hedge fund regulation through
Basel III).
92
Press Release, European Commission, Financial Services: Commission proposes EU
framework (Apr. 29, 2009), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
IP/09/669&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
[hereinafter
Press
Release: Financial Services].
93
Council Directive 2011/61, supra note 86, art. 3, at 15.
94
Press Release: Financial Services, supra note 92.
95
Council Directive 2011/61, supra note 86, at 1, ¶ 2.
96
Id. art. 22.
97
Id. art. 15.
98
Id. pmbl. ¶ 4.
99
Council Regulation 1093/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12; see infra text accompanying
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Commission Communication on the European Union framework for crisis
management in the financial sector. 100 The latter resulted in the DG
Internal Market and Service Working Document on technical details of a
possible European Union framework for bank recovery and resolution, 101 as
well as the most recent Commission proposal on the revision of the Capital
Requirements Directive. 102
1. The European System of Financial Supervisors
Since January 1, 2011, the European Union has a new European
System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS). 103 Many details about the powers
of the ESFS remain unclear, but the introduction of this new European
Union supervisory architecture generally followed recommendations made
in the de Larosiere Report. 104 The Report recognized the need to strengthen
European supervisory arrangements and recommended the establishment of
a Union-level body charged with overseeing the financial system as a
whole. 105 The prior system of financial service committees 106 only played
an advisory role with no real power, 107 and Union-wide supervision was at
best fragmented, inconsistent and ineffective. 108
It is questionable whether the ESFS may be able to address all of the
identified shortcomings. The system is primarily aimed at establishing a
European single rule book, upgrading the quality and consistency of
note 103.
100
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the
European Central Bank, COM (2010) 579 final (Nov. 20, 2010).
101
DG Working Document, supra note 10.
102
IP/11/915, supra note 8; CRD IV Directive, supra note 10; DG Working Document,
supra note 10.
103
Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 74, ¶ 69.
104
The de Larosière Grp., supra note 84.
105
Council Regulation 1092/2010, supra note 74, pmbl. ¶¶ 3–4.
106
The so-called “Lamfalussy level committees” consist of the Committee of the
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), the Committee of European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Committee (CEIOPS), and the Committee of European Securities
Regulators (CESR).
107
Commission Decision of 23 January 2009 establishing the Committee of European
Banking Supervisors (EC), 2009 O.J. (L 25) 23 [hereinafter CEBS Decision]; Commission
Decision of 23 January 2009 establishing the Committee of European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Supervisors (EC), 2009 O.J. (L 25) 28, [hereinafter CEIOPS
Decision]; Commission Decision of 23 January 2009 establishing the Committee of
European Securities Regulators (EC), 2009 O.J. (L 25) 18. [hereinafter CESR Decision].
See also Press Release, European Commission, European System of Financial Supervisors
(ESFS): Frequently Asked Questions (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/404&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en [hereinafter Press Release FAQ].
108
See, e.g., Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 74, pmbl. ¶ 8; Press Release
FAQ, supra note 107.
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national supervision, and strengthening the oversight of cross-border
groups. 109 Although the ESFS remains limited to a Union-wide early
exchange of information, it improves the prior supervisory system by
harmonizing technical standards, coordinating Union-wide supervisory
actions, and providing some decision-making powers in emergency
situations. 110
The European System of Financial Supervisors is considered an
integrated network of national and European Union supervisory
authorities. 111 It distinguishes between macro- and micro-prudential
oversight. 112 The ESFS consists of the European Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB) and three European Supervisory Authorities: the European Banking
Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA),
and the European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority
(EIOPA). 113 The ESAs replace the Committee of European Banking
Supervisors, 114 the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Supervisors, 115 and the Committee of European Securities
Regulators. 116

109

Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 74, pmbl. ¶ 5.
Id. art. 18.
111
Id. pmbl. ¶ 9.
112
Id.
113
The ESA also includes a Joint Committee of the European Authorities (Joint
Committee) and all competent or supervisory in the Member States. See, e.g., id. art. 2, at ¶
2(e)–(f). This article does not focus on all ESAs or include a comprehensive discussion of
the role of the ESFS. The goal of the article is simply to provide an overview of the ESFS in
the context of actions taken by the European Union in response to the financial crisis.
114
CEBS Decision, supra note 107.
115
CEIOPS Decision, supra note 107.
116
CESR Decision, supra note 107.
110
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The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is the systemic risk
regulator 117 of the Union charged with the task of monitoring and assessing
systemic risk in the Union. 118 It is comparable to the Financial Stability
Oversight Council under Dodd-Frank. 119 The ESRB is tasked with the duty
of developing a risk dashboard and a color code for interested parties to
help them assess the nature of systemic risk. 120 It will also work closely
with the European Supervisory Authorities in issuing recommendations121
and warnings. 122 It cooperates with the Bank of International Settlement
(BIS), the Financial Supervisory Board (FSB), and the International

117

Council Regulation 1092/2010, supra note 74, pmbl. ¶ 15, art. 3.
Id. art. 15.
119
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); Brief Summary of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous., and Urban Affairs, available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/
070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf.
120
Council Regulation 1092/2010, supra note 74, pmbl. ¶ 18; see also Jean-Claude
Trichet, Mervyn King, & Andrea Enria, European Systemic Risk Bd., Introductory Remarks
to the Press Conference (June 22, 2011), available at http://www.esrb.europa.eu/news/
pr/2011/html/is110622.en.html; Ralph Atkins, Debt Crisis Flashing Warning Signs, says
ECB chief, FIN. TIMES, June 22, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/87831328-9cfe-11e08678-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1bRdPbQqQ.
121
Council Regulation 1092/2010, supra note 74, art. 17.
122
Id. art. 16.
118
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Monetary Fund (IMF) 123 in developing international standards and
assessing global risk. 124 The President of the European Central Bank will
chair the ESRB for the first 5 years. 125 The ESRB will also have two ViceChairs, 126 a General Board, 127 a Steering Committee, 128 and two advisory
committees 129 supporting its work. 130 At the European Union level, the
ESRB is accountable and reports directly to the Council and the European
Parliament. 131
Conversely to the ESRB, the European Supervisory Authorities
(ESAs) 132 oversee the micro-prudential performance of their respective
industries with the goal of fostering convergence and promoting
coordination among the European Union Member States. 133 Specifically,
the ESAs work to guarantee a level playing field and prevent regulatory
arbitrage to strengthen international supervisory coordination. 134 In
addition, the Authorities can settle cross-border disputes among national
supervisory authorities with binding effect. 135 The Authorities also serve as
an independent advisory body to the European Parliament, the Council, and
the Commission. 136 The principal decision-making body of the ESAs is
chaired by a person with no voting power and is comprised of a board of
supervisors that includes the heads of the relevant competent supervisory
authorities in the member state. 137
The ESAs are supported by a Joint Committee of European
Supervisory Authorities. 138 The Joint Committee is composed of the
chairpersons of the ESAs and serves as a coordinating forum to ensure
cross-sectoral consistency and the exchange of information with the

123

Id. pmbl. ¶¶ 7–8.
Id. pmbl. ¶ 9.
125
Id. art. 5.
126
Id.
127
Id. art. 6.
128
Id. art. 11.
129
Id. arts. 12–13.
130
Id.
131
Id. art. 19.
132
See Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 78. See also supra text accompanying
note 103. The ESAs are: the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities
and Markets Authority (ESMA), and the European Insurance and Occupational Pension
Authority (EIOPA).
133
See, e.g., Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 74, pmbl. ¶ 11, art. 19.
134
Id.
135
Id. pmbl. ¶ 32.
136
Id. art. 45.
137
Id. art. 52; see also id. art. 40 (Representatives of the Commission, the ESRB, the
ECB, and the other respective ESAs participate as observers).
138
Id. art. 54.
124
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ESRB. 139 The Joint Committee is also responsible for settling possible
disputes between the ESAs. 140 A Board of Appeal reviews decisions by the
ESAs. 141 The European Court of Justice is the ultimate authority to review
decisions by the ESAs. 142 All competent authorities as well as any natural
and legal person involved in or subject to the ESA decision may file
appeals. 143 But, the European Commission may ultimately curtail all
powers transferred to the ESAs. 144
Among the ESAs, the European Banking Authority (EBA) 145 has the
most prominent role. In cooperation with the ESRB, the EBA initiates and
coordinates Union-wide stress tests and peer reviews of financial
institutions. 146 It also contributes to “developing methods for the resolution
of failing financial institutions, in particular those that may pose a systemic
risk, in ways which avoid contagion and allow them to be wound down in
an orderly and timely manner, including, where applicable, coherent and
robust funding mechanisms as appropriate.” 147 Moreover, the EBA
supervises the implementation of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme
Directive, 148 ensuring that all national guarantee schemes are adequately
funded. 149
The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), 150 on the
other hand, supervises any legislation and any matters related to the
Alternative Investment Funds Managers Directive 151 including issues of
corporate governance, auditing and financial reporting. 152 The ESMA
oversees and takes appropriate actions regarding takeover bids in the
financial sector, clearing and settlement, as well as derivative issues. 153 In
addition to the limitation of its power by the Commission, the ESMA is,
however, also subject to limitation by the supervisory authority of the

139

Id.
Id.
141
Id. art. 58 (stating that the Board of Appeal is a joint body of all ESAs).
142
Id. art. 61.
143
Id. art. 60.
144
Id. art. 1, at ¶ 4; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 74, art. 1, at ¶ 4; Council
Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 74, art. 1, at ¶ 4 (“4. The provisions of this Regulation are
without prejudice to the powers of the Commission, in particular under Article 258 TFEU, to
ensure compliance with Union law.”).
145
Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 74.
146
Id. ¶ 43.
147
Id. art. 27.
148
Council Directive 2009/14, 2009 O.J. (L 68) 3 (EU).
149
Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 74, art. 26.
150
Id.
151
See Council Directive 2011/61, supra note 86 and accompanying text.
152
Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 74, art. 1.
153
Id.
140
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EBA. 154
The European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority
(EIOPA) 155 is comparable to the Office of National Insurance in the U.S. 156
The EIOPA is entrusted with the supervision of all insurance and
reinsurance undertakings, insurance intermediaries, and pension funds.157
Analogous to the EBA 158 and the ESMA, 159 the EIOPA is also charged with
taking a leading role in consumer protection by promoting “transparency,
simplicity and fairness in the market for consumer financial products or
services across the internal market.” 160 Overall, the EIOPA may be
considered the European Supervisory Authority with the least power when
compared to the EBA or the ESMA. Not only is the EIOPA subject to the
limitations posed by the supervisory powers of the Commission and the
EBA, the EIOPA is also prohibited from encroaching on Member State
powers as they relate to pension funds. 161
2. Proposed Framework for Crisis Management
The most important and far reaching initiatives of the European Union
stem from the European Commission communications on crisis
management in the financial sector since 2009. 162 These communications
resulted in the latest legislative proposal from July 20, 2011, 163 on the
revisions of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV). 164

154

Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 74, art. 1, at ¶ 2 (“. . . without prejudice to
the competence of the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) in
terms of prudential supervision . . . .”).
155
Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 74.
156
National Insurance Act of 2007, H.R. 3200, 110th Cong. § 1101 (2007) (establishing
the Office of National Insurance).
157
Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 74, art. 1, at ¶¶ 2–4.
158
Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 74, art. 9.
159
Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 74, art. 9.
160
Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 74, art. 9, ¶ 1.
161
Id. art 2, at ¶ 4.
162
COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11. See also Communication from the Commission
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the
European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank, COM (2009) 561 final (Oct. 20,
2009); Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the European Central Bank, COM (2010)
254 final (May 26, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/
crisis_management/index_en.htm#funds.
The European Parliament also provided
recommendations on cross-border crisis management in the banking sector (so-called
Ferreira Report). Draft Report with Recommendations to the Commission on Cross-Border
Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, Comm. on Economic and Monetary Affairs,
2010/2006 (INI) (Apr. 7, 2010) (by Elisa Ferreira).
163
See Comm’n Services, supra note 76.
164
See, e.g., CRD IV Regulation and CRD IV Directive, supra note 10, at 10; see also id.
at 1–2.
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Based on the premise that public bail-outs of financial institutions
should never happen again 165 and that banks must be allowed to fail like
any other business, the Commission developed a framework for prevention,
crisis management, and resolution of banks. 166 At the early intervention
stage, the Commission proposed to reinforce the supervisory regime under
the current Capital Requirements Directives (CRD), 167 adding more robust
standards and more intrusive intervention tools. 168 The Commission further
identified the drafting of recovery and resolution plans (living wills) as
essential elements of effective crisis management. 169 The Commission
noted that:
A requirement for up to date resolution plans would apply to all
credit institutions and investment firms covered by the [resolution]
regime, with the aim of ensuring the planning necessary to enable the
business of the bank or firm to be transferred or wound down in an
orderly manner in the event of its failure. 170

The content of such plans may include details on group structure,
intra-group guarantees, service level agreements, and other operational
information. 171 Article 136 of the CRD provides additional preventative
powers. 172 Specifically, the ability of supervisory authorities to limit or
modify risk exposure, to increase reporting, to restrict or to prohibit certain
165

In this context, the European Commission has approved €4.6 trillion of state aid
measures to financial institutions, of which more than €2 trillion were effectively used in
2008 and 2009. See, e.g., Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission Wants Stronger
and More Responsible Banks (July 20, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/915&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en. In total, European Union governments paid state aid amounting to
approximately 30% of the combined EU GDP, while the aid used until December 2009
amounts to 13%. See, e.g., COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11, at 2.
166
COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11; DG Working Document, supra note 10.
167
See Council Directive 2006/48, 2006 O.J. (L 177) 1 (EC); Council Directive 2006/49,
2006 O.J. (L 177) 201 (EC).
168
COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11, at 5.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 6.
171
Id.
172
Council Directive 2006/48, supra note 167, at 50 (“Article 136 - 1. Competent
authorities shall require any credit institution that does not meet the requirements of this
Directive to take the necessary actions or steps at an early stage to address the situation.
For those purposes, the measures available to the competent authorities shall include the
following: (a) obliging credit institutions to hold own funds in excess of the minimum level
laid down in Article 75; (b) requiring the reinforcement of the arrangements, processes,
mechanisms and strategies implemented to comply with Articles 22 and 123; (c) requiring
credit institutions to apply a specific provisioning policy or treatment of assets in terms of
own funds requirements; (d) restricting or limiting the business, operations or network of
credit institutions; and (e) requiring the reduction of the risk inherent in the activities,
products and systems of credit institutions . . .”).
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activities, and to require a change to the legal corporate structure and
business arrangement. 173
While many of these steps mimic developments at the international
level 174 and in the United States under Dodd-Frank, 175 the European
approach is different with regard to recovery and the determination of when
a bank should be subject to wind down. 176 The Commission recognized
that a bank’s breach of capital requirements might not necessarily mean that
the institution is encountering serious problems which inevitably would
lead to failure. 177 More importantly, the Commission proposal balanced the
interest of property rights of shareholders and creditors with liquidation as
an intervention in the public interest and concluded that resolution actions
may not be taken before all other realistic recovery options are exhausted. 178
Although primarily mentioned in the context of SIFIs, 179 the
Commission recognized that supplementary mechanisms enabling a
financial institution to reorganize and continue as a going concern 180 may
also be necessary to protect financial stability and to prevent anticompetitive results. 181 While focused on making the threat of market exit a
realistic option, the Commission did not consider liquidation as the only or
best option for failing banks. 182 The Commission therefore not only
recognized that reorganization is an important option during crisis
management in order to maintain crucial activities, but also that it may
allow banks to stabilize, return to viability, and stay in the market place
without the need for public bail-outs. The supplementary mechanism that
the Commission specifically identified as a reorganization option is the debt
write-down tool that allows the contractual or statutory conversion of debt
to equity. 183

173

COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11, at 6.
FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 57, at 1. See also FIN. STABILITY BD., G20 Monitoring
Progress – United States (Sept.. 2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/ r_110401x.pdf; FIN. STABILITY BD., G20 Monitoring Progress Progress –
Germany (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications
/r_110401g.pdf.
175
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 115(d), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (“resolution
plans”).
176
See, e.g., id. §§ 214, 1442–1520.
177
COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11, at 7.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 11. The Commission refers to systemically important financial institutions
(SIFIs) as large, complex financial institutions (LCFIs).
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 8–9 (“The Commission will consider what reform of bank insolvency law is
necessary to ensure that failed banks can be liquidated as a second phase . . .with the ultimate
aim of ensuring that liquidation is a realistic option.”).
183
Id. at 12; see also DG Working Document, supra note 10, at 51, 55, 86.
174
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The Commission considered the option of a statutory write-down
supplemented by either a comprehensive or targeted approach for additional
debt-equity conversion. 184 The statutory debt write-down proposed by the
Commission would be exercisable by any national resolution authority
when an institution meets a predefined trigger condition for entry into
resolution. 185 At that point, the authority would have the power to write
down all equity and either write down subordinate debt or convert the debt
into equity (so-called statutory core power). 186 Under the comprehensive
approach, a discretionary amount of senior debt necessary to return the
institution to solvency could also be converted into equity, in addition to the
prior conversion of subordinated debt under the statutory core power. 187
The alternative to the Commission’s comprehensive approach
considered by the Commission is the targeted approach. 188 The targeted
approach combines statutory and contractual elements of debt conversion.
Prior to any financial distress, national resolution authorities would first
require financial institutions to issue a fixed volume of “bail-inable” debt. 189
This fixed volume would be converted into equity on a statutory trigger, in
addition to the conversion of debt under the statutory core power. 190 In
sum, the Commission proposed to establish haircuts for all equity
supplemented by a debt conversion of both subordinate and senior debt
when the financial institution is in danger of insolvency. The ultimate goal
of this supplementary debt conversion mechanism is to “ensure that an
institution in difficulty returns to viability so as to maintain market and
creditor confidence when the markets next open.” 191
Finally, analogous to the Dodd-Frank Act, 192 the Commission also
proposed to include the option of selling the institution or part of the
institution to one or more purchasers without consent of the shareholders. 193
In order to clean the balance sheet of a troubled bank, the proposal allows
the transfer of assets either to a temporary “bridge bank” or, in case of
generally underperforming assets, to a “bad bank”. 194

184

DG Working Document, supra note 10, at 87–89.
Id.
186
Id. at 87.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 89.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 87.
192
See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 210, 124 Stat. 1376, 1460 (2010).
193
COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11, at 9–10; see also DG Working Document,
supra note 10, at 52.
194
COM (2010) 579 final, supra note 11, at 10; see also DG Working Document, supra
note 10, at 52–55.
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3. Revisions of the Capital Requirements Directives
On July 20, 2011, the European Commission adopted a new proposal
on capital requirements for financial institutions.195 The proposal will
replace the current capital requirements directives 2006/48/EC 196 and
2006/49/EC, 197 and it marks an important step toward developing a
comprehensive regime for crisis prevention, bank recovery, and resolution
in the European Union. The proposal is also the first legal framework to
incorporate the third Basel Accord endorsed by the G20 at its summit in
Seoul in November 2010. 198 And, if enacted by the European Parliament
and the Council, would apply to more than 8000 banks, amounting to
approximately 53% of global assets. 199
The proposal consists of both a directive 200 and a regulation. 201 The
directive regulates access to deposit-taking activities, including sanctions,
effective corporate governance and provisions preventing the overreliance
on external credit ratings. 202 In addition, the directive also deals with the
Basel III agreement as it relates to the provisions on capital buffers. 203 Of
particular interest are the measures proposed in the context of management
risk taking 204 and capital buffers. 205
Considering the importance of effective risk control, the Commission
proposes the establishment of a “risk committee to deal specifically with
risk issues and prepare management body decisions on risk issues . . . [and
to] assist the management body in its risk oversight role. . .” 206 In addition,
the Commission believes the establishment of an independent risk
management function is essential in order to provide all levels of
management with a complete and more accurate view on risks and possible
risk exposure. 207
Regarding capital buffers, the Commission proposes a system of dual
capital buffers in addition to the capital requirements: a capital conservation
buffer and a countercyclical capital buffer. 208 The capital conservation

195

IP/11/915, supra note 8.
Council Directive 2006/48, supra note 167.
197
Council Directive 2006/49, supra note 167.
198
See G20 Seoul Summit, supra note 56 and accompanying text.
199
IP/11/915, supra note 8.
200
CRD IV Directive, supra note 10.
201
CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10.
202
CRD IV Directive, supra note 10, at 2.
203
Id. Other changes relating to the third Basel Accord are part of the proposal for a
regulation.
204
Id. at 11–12.
205
Id. at 12–13.
206
Id. at 11.
207
Id. at 12 (the proposal refers to “senior management” and “management body”).
208
Id.
196
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buffer is aimed at loss absorbency in a financial crisis and has a target
amount of 2.5% of risk-weighted assets of the highest quality. 209 Financial
institutions that fall below the buffer target are subject to limitations on
discretionary distributions of earnings. 210
The additional countercyclical buffer that the Commission
recommends seeks to protect financial stability and the economy at large by
limiting the effects of various system-wide risks. 211 The countercyclical
buffer increases the size of the buffer range up to an additional 2.5%.212
The discretion to set the actual size of the countercyclical buffer is,
however, left to national authorities and may be set between 0% and 2.5%
of risk-weighted assets of the highest quality. 213 The ceiling of 2.5% is
flexible, providing national authorities with the power to go beyond 2.5% if
justified. 214 Regardless, if a member state sets the buffer above 2.5%, other
Member States do have the additional discretion to accept or reject that
judgment for financial institutions authorized in their own member state. 215
It is also noteworthy that in addition to restrictions on profit distributions,
institutions whose capital falls below the buffers are subject to limitations
on payments on Additional Tier 1 instruments, 216 bonuses and discretionary
pension benefits. 217
Under the mutual recognition requirement, all Member States may be
forced to harmonize the size of their countercyclical buffers Union-wide. If
only one Member State, such as Germany, implements sizeable
countercyclical buffers all other Member States will be forced to accept this
requirement of up to 2.5% for their own financial institutions as long as
these institutions are doing business in or maintaining branches and
subsidiaries in Germany. Therefore, the financially stronger Member States
with the largest financial sectors may dictate the size of countercyclical
buffers for smaller Member States, thereby practically reducing any
proposed national discretion. The only relevant area where some national
discretion may remain is where countercyclical buffers are set above the
ceiling for mutual recognition or between 2.5% and 5%. The Commission
proposal explicitly allows Member States to implement countercyclical
buffers of up to 5%, but limits mutual recognition to the 2.5% ceiling. Even
in these instances, the proposed discretion may be misleading. For
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Id.; see also id. art. 123, ¶ 1, at 133.
Id. art. 123, ¶ 1, at 124, ¶ 3, at 133.
211
Id. art. 123, ¶ 1, at 124, ¶ 3, at 113.
212
Id. at 12; see also id. art. 126, ¶ 5, at 115.
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Id. art. 126, ¶ 1, at 13–14 .
214
Id. art. 126, ¶¶ 3, 5.
215
Id; see also id. art. 127, at ¶ 1.
216
Additional Tier 1 capital is defined in the proposed regulation. CRD IV Regulation,
supra note 10, arts. 48–52.
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CRD IV Directive, supra note 10, art. 131, at 13.
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example, if the U.K. intends to set its countercyclical measure at 5% but
Germany requires no more than 2.5%, it seems unlikely that the Bank of
England and the British government, long term, would be willing to give
German banks, a significant competitive advantage over their national
financial institutions, especially if the British government maintains
significant ownership in some of these institutions.
Finally, the Commission suggests a limitation on the use of external
credit ratings. 218 Specifically, the Commission proposes that external credit
ratings may only be used as one factor and that financial institutions with
material credit risk exposure or a high number of counterparties should be
required to develop additional internal rating models rather than only
relying on external ratings. 219
In addition to the directive, the regulation 220 proposed by the
Commission aims to ensure the effectiveness of institutional capital
regulation, It aims to protect depositors and to limit possible pro-cyclical
effects while maintaining competitiveness of the European financial
markets. 221 In order to achieve this goal the regulation not only implements
the Basel III agreement, 222 it also focuses on maximum harmonization with
the goal of achieving a true “single rule book.” 223 The proposal seeks to
harmonize different national supervisory regimes by almost entirely
removing any options or discretion. 224
As part of its proposal, the Commission has also adopted 225 the Basel
Committee’s minimum requirements on loss absorbency at the point of
non-viability. 226 Accordingly, “all Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments
of an institution should be fully and permanently written down or converted
fully into Common Equity Tier 1 capital at the point of non-viability of the
institution.” 227 In Article 49(1)(n), the proposed regulation defines one
form of “Additional Tier 1 instruments” as a capital instrument in which
“the provisions governing the instruments require the principal amount of
the instruments to be written down, or the instruments to be converted to
Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, upon the occurrence of a trigger
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Id. at 12.
Id.
220
CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10.
221
Id. at 2.
222
Id. at 10–15. See also CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, ¶ 24 & art. 87, at 20.
223
CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, at 8.
224
Id.
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CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, ¶ 27, at 20.
226
Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Final Elements of the Reforms to Raise the
Quality of Regulatory Capital Issued by the Basel Committee (Jan. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.bis.org/press/p110113.htm.
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CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, at 20, ¶ 27.
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event.” 228
Contingent capital is defined as the conversion or write down of a
financial institution’s debt securities into equity securities upon the
occurrence of a predefined trigger event. 229 As such, contingent capital
would qualify as an “Additional Tier 1 instrument” under the Commission’s
proposal. However, the Commission proposal seems to distinguish between
different forms of contingent capital and additional Tier 1 instruments by
defining different write-down and conversion requirements. 230 Article
51(a)(i) sets a statutory default trigger at 5.125% of the common equity tier
1 ratio. 231 While upward exceptions are allowed, 232 the proposal also
stipulates a specific and seemingly separate 233 set of conversion and writedown requirements. 234 First, if the instrument requires conversion into a
common equity tier 1 instrument it is required to specify (a) the rate of
conversion and the limit on the permitted amount of conversion, 235 and (b) a
range within which the instrument will convert into common equity tier 1
instruments. 236 Second, if the instrument requires the principal amount to
be written down upon the occurrence of a trigger event, the write-down is
required to reduce (a) the claim of the holder of the instrument during
liquidation, 237 (b) the amount required to be paid in the event of the call of
the instrument, 238 and (c) the distributions made on the instrument. 239
228

Id. at 76.
See discussion supra Part I; see also discussion infra Part IV.
230
With regard to the distinction by financial institution attempted in Article 51(a), the
distinction is ambiguous and requires further clarification or amendment. Specifically, the
statutory reference in § 51, ¶ (a) (“of the institution referred to in point (a) of Article 87”) is
unclear and indeterminate.
231
CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, § 51, ¶ (a)(i).
232
Id. § 51, ¶ (a)(ii).
233
Id. The statutory relationship between the three subsections in Article 51 is also open
to interpretation. Article 51(a) seems to establish a statutory write-down tool similar to that
proposed by the Commission in the DG Internal Market and Service Working Document.
DG Working Document, supra note 10, at 87. At the same time, the exception to the default
trigger event established in Article 51(a)(ii) requires an instrument with a specified trigger
event included in the instrument, which is defined by the financial institution and necessarily
must be based on contractual terms. This merges two concepts of the proposal in the DG
Working Document the concept of a statutory debt write-down tool with that of a contractual
write-down tool. It is unclear from the regulation proposal whether the additional trigger
event requirements defined in section (b) and (c) are contingent upon the definition in
section (a)(ii). In other words, it is unclear whether the requirements of section (b) and (c)
only apply to “Additional Tier 1 instruments” that set at least a trigger event of 5.125% as a
minimum requirement or whether these requirements are to be viewed as independent.
234
CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, § 51, ¶¶ (b) and (c).
235
Id. § 51, ¶ (b)(i).
236
Id. § 51, ¶ (b)(ii).
237
Id. § 51, ¶ (c)(i).
238
Id. § 51, ¶ (c)(ii).
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Id. § 51, ¶ (c)(iii).
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C. National Initiatives in Europe
Many countries in Europe, including non-European Union Member
States, have actively pursued a reform of national banking and insolvency
laws. 240 Although Switzerland is not a member of the European Union and
the United Kingdom has not adopted the Euro, the Swiss approach and the
approach of the United Kingdom to bank reorganization have served as
examples for the reform of the German Banking Law as well as many
European Union initiatives. The national initiatives in both countries
suggest a need for convergence of international and European Union-wide
bank recovery and resolution regimes. At the European Union level, there
is some evidence that many national laws implemented during the crisis,
including the German Banking Reorganization Act, 241 may need to be
amended in order to meet the EU-wide objective of maximum
harmonization with the goal of achieving a single-rule book. 242
1. Bank Reorganization under Swiss Law 243
The Swiss Federal Law on Banks and Savings and Loans 244 includes
specific rules for bank reorganization independent of the Swiss bankruptcy
code. 245 The reorganization procedure is part of the Swiss Supervisory
Authority’s (FINMA) intervention powers and may only be ordered if
success is reasonably likely. 246 In addition, sufficient evidence of pending
insolvency, significant liquidity problems, or evidence that the bank is
unable to meet capital requirements is required for this procedure. 247 The
Supervisory Authority may further appoint a trustee charged with drafting
the reorganization plan. 248 Unless challenged by creditors in court, 249 the
Authority approves and implements the plan without any court
240
See, e.g., Bundesgesetz über die Banken und Sparkassen, [Federal Law on Banks,
Savings and Loans], BANKENGESETZ [BANKG] Nov. 1934, vol. 8 (Switz.), available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf; see infra text accompanying note 243.
241
Id.
242
CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, at 10.
243
Bundesgesetz über die Banken und Sparkassen [BANKG] [Federal Law on Banks and
Savings and Loans] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952 (Switz.), available at http://www.admin.ch/
ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf.
244
Bundesgesetz über die Banken und Sparkassen [BANKG] [Federal Law on Banks and
Savings and Loans] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952 (Switz.), available at http://www.admin.ch/
ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf.
245
Urs Zulauf, Schweizer Banken Sanierungsrecht – geeignet für systemrelevante
Banken?, WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN: ZEITSCHRIFT 1525, 1530 (2010) (Ger.).
246
Bundesgesetz über die Banken und Sparkassen [BANKG] [Federal Law on Banks,
Savings and Loans] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952, at art. 28 (Switz.), available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf.
247
Id. art.25, ¶ 1.
248
Id. art. 28, ¶ 3.
249
Id. art. 31a, ¶¶ 2–3.
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confirmation. 250 In addition to the Swiss Supervisory Authority’s central
role in initiating and overseeing a possible reorganization procedure, the
Authority may also reduce or avoid claims and may defer or cease any debt
payments. 251 As in the U.S., 252 the principle of “no creditor worse-off than
in liquidation” applies; the impairment of creditors’ claims is limited to the
amount of the claim in liquidation. 253
Similar to many European civil law jurisdictions, in Switzerland the
Swiss Supervisory Authority has a dual role as supervisory and resolution
authority of financial institutions at the same time. An administrative
agency, rather than a bankruptcy court therefore generally oversees
insolvency proceedings in Switzerland. The perceived advantage is better
knowledge of the banking sector that may result in a more efficient and
expeditious procedure. The clear disadvantage is the broad discretion of the
agency in overseeing financial institutions. Furthermore, under Swiss law
the investigatory and supervisory role of creditors are limited. There is no
mandatory requirement to appoint creditors’ committees. Finally, Swiss
law does not provide for an automatic stay or allow the financial institution
or creditors to challenge any of the measures ordered by the Supervisory
Authority other then plan approval. 254
The Swiss legislature has enacted and amended the Swiss Bank Act.255
The latest amendments specifically focus on the creation of a legal basis for
contingent capital that would allow financial institutions to meet capital
requirements through the issuance of contingent capital. 256
2. The British Banking Act of 2009
The British Banking Act may be the most comprehensive legal
framework in response to the turmoil of the financial crisis. 257 Before 2008,
the United Kingdom did not have a permanent statutory regime for dealing
with bank failures. 258 It introduced the Banking (Special Provisions) Act of

250

Id. art. 32.
Id. art. 26.
252
See, e.g., U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(ii) (2006).
253
Bundesgesetz über die Banken und Sparkassen [BANKG] [Federal Law on Banks,
Savings and Loans] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952, at art. 31(b) (Switz.), available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf.
254
Zulauf, supra note 248, at 1531 (Zulauf argues that in light of the expeditious nature
of the procedure creditors are provided with too many rights).
255
See infra Part IV.C.
256
Id.
257
See, e.g., Paul Anning & Matthias Terlau, Maßnahmen gegen die Finanzmarktkrise –
Großbritannien [Measures to tackle the financial crisis—UK], 55 Recht der Internationalen
Wirtschaft 54 (2009) (Ger.); Höche, supra note 7, at 51.
258
See Banking Act, 2009, c.1, Explanatory Notes, ¶ 7 (U.K.), available at http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/1/notes.
251
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2008 in response to the Northern Rock failure. 259 The Banking (Special
Provisions) Act of 2008, however, only provided a temporary regime
allowing the Treasury to facilitate an orderly resolution of banks and
maintain financial stability. 260 The Banking (Special Provisions) Act of
2008 lapsed on February 20, 2009, 261 and was replaced by the Banking Act
2009. 262
The Banking Act 2009 (the Act) established a permanent special
resolution regime (SRR) providing the authorities in the United Kingdom
with the necessary tools to deal with banks in financial distress. 263 The Act
provides for three distinct options under SRR: (1) a stabilization procedure
focusing on asset transfer; 264 (2) a new bank insolvency procedure265
focusing on orderly wind-down and liquidation; 266 and (3) a new bank
administration procedure. 267 The decision to exercise a procedure under the
SRR requires participation of the Tripartite Authorities: the HM Treasury,
the Bank of England, and the Financial Services Authority (FSA). 268 The
Tripartite Authorities coordinate, cooperate, and share information at each
stage of the decision making process. 269
Before choosing among the different resolution tools, the Bank of
England must conduct a benefits analysis and consider the relative

259

Banking (Special Provisions) Act, 2008, c. 2 (U.K.), available at http://www.legis
lation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/2/pdfs/ukpga_20080002en.pdf.
260
See, e.g., Banking Act 2009 (Commencement No. 1) Order, 2009, c.14, Explanatory
Note (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/296/note/made; see also
Banking Act, 2009, c. 1, § 262 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2009/1/section/262.
261
Banking Act, 2009, c. 1, §§ 262–64 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/2009/1/pdfs/ukpga_20090001_en.pdf.
262
Banking Act, 2009, c. 1 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2009/1/pdfs/ukpga_20090001_en.pdf. See also Banking Act 2009 (Commencement No. 3)
Order, 2009, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/2038/contents/made;
Banking Act 2009 (Commencement No. 4) Order, 2009, available at http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/uksi/2009/3000/contents/made.
263
Banking Act, 2009, c.1, §4 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2009/1/section/4.
264
The stabilization procedures offers three different options, all of which focus on asset
transfer: (1) transfer to a private sector purchaser, (2) transfer to a bridge bank, and (3)
transfer to temporary public ownership.
265
Banking Act, 2009, c. 1, §§ 90–135 (U.K.).
266
Id. § 96.
267
Id. §§ 136–68.
268
The tripartite structure of the Supervisory Authorities of the U.K. financial system
bears clear resemblance to the so-called “three key turn” under Dodd-Frank, see, e.g., SKEEL,
supra note 1, at 130.
269
See, e.g., HM Treasury, Banking Act 2009 Special Resolution Regime: Code of
Practice, at 11, available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/bankingact2009_code_of_
practice. pdf.
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advantage of the stabilization option over insolvency and wind-down. 270
The stabilization procedure may only be initiated after the Financial
Services Authority (FSA) determines that three conditions are met. 271 First,
the FSA must conclude that the institution is failing or unlikely to satisfy
certain threshold conditions. 272 Second, the FSA must find that it is not
reasonably likely that the bank will take or be able to take any action to
meet the threshold conditions. 273 Third, the FSA must also decide that there
is no realistic prospect that the bank will operate as an authorized deposit
taker. 274 In addition to the aforementioned conditions, the Bank of England
is required to establish that the stabilization procedure is necessary to
protect the stability of the financial system of the United Kingdom, to
ensure public confidence in the stability of the system, and to protect
depositors. 275
Stabilization may be the best option when transfers to a private sector
purchaser, to a bridge bank, or temporary public ownership seem more cost
effective or any such transfers would provide a better platform and starting
point for reorganization. 276 However, insolvency may be the best option if
contagion is a real threat and liquidation would affect overall system
stability as well as creditors’ and depositors’ confidence. The factors in
favor of exercising the insolvency procedure include, for example,
considerations of whether a wind down would be fair and equitable or
whether it would be in the public interest. 277 The new bank administration
procedure is a procedure that specifically deals with the wind down of the
insolvent residual bank that remains after a partial asset transfer to a bridge
bank or private sector purchaser was executed. 278
Although the Act does not explicitly refer to contingent capital, debtequity swaps or write-down tools, the Act does allow the use of company
voluntary arrangements, 279 which may fulfill the very same purpose as any
traditional debt-equity swap in bankruptcy. 280 In addition, one bank in the
270

Id. at 15, ¶ 5.18.
Banking Act, 2009, c.1, §7 (U.K.).
272
Financial Services and Market Act, 2000, c. 8, § 41 (U.K.), available at http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/8/contents.
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Id.
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Id.
275
Id. § 8.
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Id. ¶¶ 5.19–5.22.
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Banking Act, 2009, c. 1, §96 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2009/1/section/262.
278
Id. ¶¶ 7.5–7.8, at 29. The administrative procedure is based on the administrative
procedure under Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
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Id. § 113.
280
Id. § 154; see also Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 1(1) (U.K.) (“The directors of a
company . . . may make a proposal under this Part to the company and to its creditors for a
composition in satisfaction of its debts or a scheme of arrangement of its affairs (from here
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U.K., the Lloyd’s Banking Group 281 has already issued contingent capital
and a second, Barclays 282 is attempting to do the same. The Lloyd’s
Banking Group issued its contingent convertibles as enhanced capital notes,
which are classified under Basel II as subordinate debt or lower tier-2
capital, 283 and do not require any additional regulatory validation.
Furthermore, the U.K. is currently also considering additional banking law
reform, which specifically centers on making the U.K. banking system
more stable and more competitive. 284 Contingent capital may be used as a
supplementary measure to create effective loss-absorbing debt. 285
3. The German Banking Reorganization Act of 2010
Late in 2011, Germany followed other European countries and enacted
its own bank reorganization law. 286 The law includes three main sections
addressed in this article: (1) the Financial Institution Reorganization Act
(Kreditinstitute-Reorganisationsgesetz), 287 (2) the Amendment to the
German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz), 288 and (3) the Law Establishing
the
Reorganization
Fund
for
Financial
Institutions
(Restrukturierungsfondsgesetz). 289
Most noteworthy, the law creates a two-tiered approach to bank
reorganization.
The first tier focuses on voluntary reorganization
procedures solely initiated by the financial institutions prior to or outside of
on referred to, in either case, as a ‘voluntary arrangement’).”).
281
JACKIE INEKE ET AL., MORGAN STANLEY RES., INVESTMENT GRADE CREDIT: EUROPEAN
BANKS 25 (2011).
282
Patrick Jenkins, Barclays Set to Follow Swiss Lead, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2011),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7f3c49ea-386e-11e0-959c00144feabdc0.html#axzz1
THW9e9vY. See also infra, note 517 and accompanying text.
283
George M. Furstenberg, Contingent Capital to Strengthen the Private Safety Net for
Financial Institutions: Cocos to the Rescue 10 (Deutsche Bundesbank, Discussion Paper
Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies No. 01/2011, 2011), available at
http://www.bundesbank.de/download/bankenaufsicht/dkp/201101dkp_b_.pdf.
284
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT CONSULTATION ON REFORM
OPTIONS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2011).
285
Id. at 7.
286
Gesetz zur Restrukturierung und geordneten Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten, zur
Errichtung eines Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute und zur Verlängerung der
Verjährungsfrist der aktienrechtlichen Organhaftung [RStruktG] [German Banking
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL I at 1900.
287
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900 (Ger.) [hereinafter
[KredReorgG][Financial Institution Reorganization Act]].
288
Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Titel I [BGBL. I] at 2776 [hereinafter [KWG] [German Banking
Act]].
289
Gesetz zur Einrichtung eines Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute [RStrukFG]
[Law Establishing the Restructuring Fund for Financial Institutions], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I
at 1900 (Ger.).
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any formal insolvency proceeding. The second tier allows for increased
early regulatory intervention by the Federal Financial Supervisory
Authority (BaFin), 290 including asset transfer. 291 Analogous to the
European Union Commission proposal, 292 the German law follows an early
intervention strategy and attempts to address the issue of “too big to fail” or
“too interconnected to fail.” As in the United States, the possibility of
insolvency proved to be an insufficient threat for financial institutions
during the height of the financial crisis in Germany. Financial institutions
in Germany relied on state aid to be bailed out. The reliance on a public
bail-out without the threat of any significant losses shared by management,
shareholders and creditors may have created an asymmetric incentive for
excessive risk taking by financial institutions. 293 The German law tries to
address this failure by making market exit without state aid for financial
institutions a credible and not merely a theoretical option.
(a) The German Financial Institution Reorganization Act
The Financial Institution Reorganization Act (KreditinstitutenReorganisationsgesetz) 294 establishes a reorganization procedure
specifically aimed at financial institutions in Germany. This procedure is
different from a formal insolvency procedure under German law. This is of
particular importance because the German Insolvency Act (German
Bankruptcy Code) 295 until recently continued to be primarily associated
with liquidation as the only option for insolvent businesses and
corporations. 296
Unlike the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the German Insolvency Act does
290

Bundesanstalt
für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
[BaFin];
see
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz [FinDAG] [Act Establishing the Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority], Apr. 22, 2002, BGBL. I at 1310 (Ger.).
291
Gesetz zur Restrukturierung und geordneten Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten, zur
Errichtung eines Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute und zur Verlängerung der
Verjährungsfrist der aktienrechtlichen Organhaftung [RStruktG] [German Banking
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL I at 1900. (The German Banking Reorganization
Act includes two additional sections that are noteworthy. The first section qualifies the
powers of the Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilization (“Bundesanstalt für
Finanzmarktstabilisierung (FSMA)”). The second amends the statute of limitations for the
liability of board members of public limited companies for wrongful acts or negligence.)
292
See supra Part III.B.2., note 163 and accompanying text.
293
Coffee, supra note 26, at 798–99; see Charles W. Calomiris & Richard J. Herring,
Why and How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement 1 (Apr. 19, 2011)
(Working Paper, on file Univ. of Pa.), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1815406.
294
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900 (Ger.).
295
Insolvenzordnung [InsO] [German Insolvency Act], Oct. 5, 1994, BGBL. I at 2866.
296
Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 221; Lars Westpfahl, Vorinsolvenzliches
Sanierungsverfahren, 2010 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS – UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT
[ZGR] 385, 392 (Ger.).
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not clearly distinguish between Chapter 7 liquidation and Chapter 11
reorganization procedures. As a result, the German law traditionally stands
much closer to the original meaning of bankruptcy, implying the idea of
liquidating the debtor’s present assets and distributing these assets among
creditors on an equitable basis. 297 In addition, the German regulatory
intervention regime for financial institutions did not allow for any
procedure that would have reliably permitted operating a bank as a going
concern during the financial crisis. One of the few tools available was a socalled moratorium to restrict deposits and withdrawals or to temporarily
close the bank for business. 298 It is unlikely that any one person or investor
would conduct business with a financial institution limited in that
manner. 299
The German Financial Institution Reorganization Act entered into
force on January 1, 2011, and is in part modeled after the Swiss Law and
the UK Banking Act of 2008 and 2009. 300 However, some similarities to
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code can also be observed.
The German law emphasizes a voluntary reorganization petition filed
by the financial institution in distress with the Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
(BaFin)). 301 The law further distinguishes between two independent
procedures, the stabilization procedure (Sanierungsverfahren) and the
reorganization procedure (Reorganisationsverfahren). 302
297
In Germany, the opinion that a financial institution cannot be reorganized after
petitioning for bankruptcy protection persists. See Westpfahl, supra note 300, at 392;
Reinhard Bork, Grundfragen des Restrukturierungsrechts – Prologue zu einer Reform des
deutschen Insolvenzrechts, 2010 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT UND
INSOLVENZPRAXIS [ZIP] 397. See also Heribert Hirte, Bela Knopf & Sebastian Mock, Das
Gesetz zur Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen (Teil I), 2011 Der Betrieb [DB],
632 (arguing that with the new reform of the German Insolvency Act, taking effect on March
1, 2012, the German legislature has now substantially increased creditors’ autonomy by
introducing a broader business reorganization procedure). On the U.S. view, see SKEEL,
supra note 1. For a discussion of the original meaning of bankruptcy, see CHARLES JORDAN
TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1039 (2d ed. 2009).
298
See Gesetz über das Kreditwesen (Kreditwesengesetz) [KWG] [German Banking Act]
Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I at 2776, as amended, § 47; see also Schuster & Westpfahl, supra
note 2, at 392; Bork, supra note 297, at 406.
299
See Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 221; see also Gregor Bachmann, Das neue
Restrukturierungsrecht der Kreditinstitute, 2010 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR BANKRECHT UND
BANKWIRTSCHAFT [ZBB] 459 (Ger.); Jens-Hinrich Binder, Institutionalisierte
Krisenbewältigung bei Kreditinstituten, 2009 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR BANKRECHT UND
BANKWIRTSCHAFT [ZBB] 19, 21 (Ger.).
300
See discussion supra Part III.C.1. and III.A.2.
301
See
Gesetz zur
Reorganisation
von Kreditinstituten
(KreditinstituteReorganizationsgesetz) [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution Reorganization Act] Dec. 9,
2010, BGBL. I, at 1900; see also supra text accompanying note 294.
302
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, §1(1) (Ger.).
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(i) Stabilization Procedure
The stabilization procedure (Sanierungsverfahren) 303 does not allow
for a discharge of prior claims, the impairment of creditors’ rights, or any
encroachment of third party rights without party consent. 304 However, the
stabilization procedure permits the issuance of new shares, debt conversion,
and debt rescheduling or debt subordination. The focus of the procedure is
the voluntary participation of all creditor groups interested in recapitalizing
the financial institution. Unlike the British stabilization procedure under
the Banking Act 2009, the German stabilization procedure does not permit
asset transfers at this stage and is controlled by the debtor. The main
advantage of the stabilization procedure is the possibility for new lenders to
receive a priming lien or super-priority for loans. 305 Super-priority is
extended for the duration of three years and effective only in case of the
commencement of liquidation proceedings during that period. 306 However,
the total volume of all loans qualifying for super-priority during the
stabilization procedure is limited to 10% of the bank’s own funds. 307
Any financial institution in Germany 308 may initiate a stabilization
procedure by voluntary petition. 309 The financial institution must notify the
Federal Supervisory Authority of its existing financial distress and need for
reorganization. Along with the petition, the institution must submit a
detailed stabilization plan and nominate a trustee (Sanierungsberater). 310
303

Id. § 2.
Id. § 2(2).
305
Id. This is clearly very similar to U.S. Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. § 364(d), which
permits the debtor in possession, after court approval, to incur debt “secured by a senior or
equal lien on property of the estate that is subject to a lien.” Note, however, if the financial
institution files for bankruptcy within 3 years of the stabilization procedure, subordinated
creditors may challenge the super-priority by claiming that the petitioner did not meet the
conditions for the stabilization procedure and that the loan volume did not comply with the
legal requirements. See § 3(2). One is further reminded of the absolute priority rule under
U.S. Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8). See, e.g., David A. Skeel, The Nature and
Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 484
(1992).
306
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 2(2) (Ger.).
307
Id.
308
Gesetz über das Kreditwesen (Kreditwesengesetz) [KWG] [German Banking Act]
Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I at 2776, as amended, § 1(1). In Germany, financial institutions are
required to maintain their headquarters in the country in which they are registered. Id. §
33(6); see also art. 11, ¶ 2a; Council Directive 2006/48, supra note 167, art. 17.
309
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 2(1), (Ger.).
310
Id. §2(2). Please note, the translation of “Sanierungsberater” as trustee is not a literal
translation. Instead, the literal translation as “advisor” appears somewhat misleading in the
U.S. context. Both the “Sanierungsberater” and the “Reorganisationsberater” display
powers and functions similar to a trustee under U.S. bankruptcy law. It is important to note,
however, that a trustee under the U.S. Bankruptcy Law also has some additional and more
304
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Upon petition, the Authority reviews the petition, the proposed plan,
and the qualifications of the nominated trustee. If all requirements are
satisfied and no additional amendments to the plan are made, the Authority
moves to petition 311 the competent court for approval of the reorganization
under the stabilization procedure and requests the confirmation of the
reorganization plan. 312 The court reviews the petition and the proposed
plan independently for a second time. 313 If satisfied, the court confirms the
plan and orders the appointment of the trustee. 314 Like the concept of a
debtor in possession (DIP) under U.S. law, 315 the trustee may be a member
of the board or other person directly associated with the financial institution
petitioning for reorganization. 316 The main duty of the trustee is to
supervise and implement the reorganization plan. The trustee may also act
as an advisor to the troubled financial institution itself and directly
participate in the corporate governance of the institution. 317
Unlike U.S. law, the court’s confirmation of the plan does not
complete the reorganization under the stabilization procedure. Instead, the
successful implementation of the stabilization plan is a prerequisite.318
During the implementation phase, the trustee continuously reports to the
Federal Supervisory Authority and the court 319 and must provide detailed
updates on the status of the implementation of the plan. 320 The court may
further order additional measures if it deems them necessary and depending

far-reaching powers when compared to those of the “Sanierungsberater” and
“Reorganisationsberater” under German law.
311
Id. § 2(3).
312
The competent court is the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht or OLG) in
Frankfurt/Main. See Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz [FinDAG] [Act Establishing the
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority], Apr. 22, 2002, BGBL. I at 1310, § 1(3).
313
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 3(1) (Ger.)
314
Id. § 3(1). A court hearing is not required with the exception of cases in which the
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority determined that the trustee nominated by the
financial institution is not qualified. See § 2(3); see also § 1(3); § 1(2) (in conjunction with
Zivilprozeßordnung [ZPO] [Federal Code of Civil Procedure], Dec. 5, 2005, as amended,
§128, para. 4 (Ger.)); Gesetzentwurf Sept. 27, 2010, BT 17/3024, at 44 (Ger.).
315
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1107 (2006).
316
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 3(3) (Ger.). In addition, the court
may order the trustee to participate in the management of all business aspects of the financial
institution during the level 1 reorganization procedure. See id. §5(1), no. 2. If the trustee is
a member of the board or associated with the financial institution, the Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority may, however, petition the OLG Frankfurt to replace him. Good
cause is not required for replacement. Id. § 3(3).
317
Id. § 6(1).
318
Id. § 6(3).
319
Id. §§ 4(2), 6(2).
320
Id.
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on the progress of plan implementation. 321 Specifically, the court can
prohibit or restrict any activities of current executive officers or members of
management, including present ownership. 322 The court may also appoint
the trustee as an active member of management who participates in
corporate governance during the reorganization. 323 It can restrict or prohibit
withdrawals and the distribution of profits, 324 review existing remuneration
and bonus agreements, and prohibit any payment for services not due. 325
Most importantly, the court can pre-empt any required approval of the
corporate supervisory board in the context of the reorganization. 326
To complete the reorganization of any financial institution under the
stabilization procedure, the trustee is required to notify the Federal
Financial Supervisory Authority first. 327 Following this notice, the trustee
may notify the court of the completion, which then formally orders the
conclusion of the procedure. 328 If the stabilization procedure did not return
the financial institution to solvency and has proved unsuccessful, the
financial institution may be liquidated or may petition for protection under
the reorganization procedure, which is the second independent
reorganization procedure under German law. 329

321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
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Id. § 5.
Id. § 5(1), no. 1.
Id. § 5(1), no. 2.
Id. § 5(1), no. 3.
Id. § 5(1), no. 4.
Id. § 5(1), no. 5.
Id. § 6(3).
Id.
Id. §§ 6(3), 7.
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(ii) Reorganization Procedure
The reorganization procedure (Reorganisationsverfahren) is only
available to systemically important financial institutions.330 All other
financial institutions must be liquidated or are limited to petition for
protection under the stabilization procedure. 331 Given the threat of failure
of a systemically relevant bank, the main focus of the reorganization
procedure is the systemic relevance of any financial institution in distress
and the avoidance of any possible threat of contagion to the entire financial
system in Germany. Under German Law, systemically relevant banks have
two options for reorganization. The banks may either reorganize under the

330

Id. § 7(2); see also Yvonne Stengel, Das Kreditinstitute-Reorganisationsgesetz:
Rechtliche Aspekte der zukünftigen Sanierung und Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten, DER
BETRIEB, Supp. 4, 2011, at 11, 12; Karsten Müller-Eising et al., Das BankenRestrukturierungsgesetz, BETRIEBS-BERATER, Jan. 10, 2011, at 66, 70; Höche, supra note7,
at 54; Manfred Obermüller, Das Bankenrestrukturierungsgesetz – Ein kurzer Überblick über
ein langes Gesetz, 3 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INSOLVENZRECHT 81, 88 (2011). Please note the
term ”systemically relevant” may be used interchangably with the term “systemically
important.”
331
[KredReorgG] [Financial Institution Reorganization Act] § 3(3); see supra text
accompanying note 333.
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stabilization procedure or the reorganization procedure. The stabilization
procedure is not required as a precondition for the reorganization procedure.
Instead, if the systemically relevant bank is convinced that reorganization
under the stabilization procedure is not an option, the bank may instead
immediately petition the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority
(BaFin) for protection under the reorganization procedure. 332 In terms of
systemically important financial institutions the voluntary reorganization
procedure has one specific shortcoming.
Unlike the involuntary
reorganization procedure initiated by the Supervisory Authority under the
German Banking Act, 333 groups of financial institutions, financial holding
groups, or conglomerates are not eligible to petition for protection under the
voluntary reorganization procedure. 334 Financial institutions in group
structures and holdings will qualify as systemically important institutions.
In case of failure, these entities may also pose the highest risk to the
stability of the financial markets.
The German reorganization procedure is similar to the stabilization
procedure. It is independent of the German Insolvency Act, 335 while at the
same time exhibiting similar aspects. 336 The procedure also compares to
Chapter 11 under U.S. Bankruptcy Law 337 and the Arrangement Procedure
under British Law. 338 For example, claims must be filed and validated.339
Claims may be impaired, reduced, avoided, or deferred, and debt can be
restructured without each individual creditor’s consent. 340 Nevertheless,
employees’ income, retirement claims, and certain secured interests 341 are
exempt and protected. 342 In that sense, the reorganization procedure for
332
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 7(1) (Ger.).
333
Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I
at 2776.
334
Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note2, at 282–83.
335
See KredReorgG [Financial Institution Reorganization Act]; see Insolvenzordnung
[InsO] [German Insolvency Statute] Oct. 5, 1994, BGBl. I 2866; see Schuster & Westpfahl,
supra note 2, at 221; see Lars Westpfahl, Vorinsolvenzliches Sanierungsverfahren, 2010
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS – UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 385, 392 (Ger.).
336
See Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 225.
337
See, e.g., U.S. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2006) (the concept of a debtor in
possession (DIP) is exhibited in the German provisions of the Gesetz zur Reorganisation von
Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010,
BGBL. I at 1900, § 3(3) (Ger.), which in resemblance of a DIP permits that the appointed
trustee (“Sanierungsberater”) may be a member of the distressed bank).
338
Banking Act, 2009, c.1, §§ 113, 154 (U.K.).
339
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 14 (Ger.).
340
Id. at §12.
341
Id. Creditor claims protected by any voluntary or statutory deposit insurance cannot
be impaired (“Einlagensicherungsfonds”).
342
Id. One intention for the protection of employees’ and other rights was the desire to
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financial institutions under German Law provides many aspects of
bankruptcy protection at a pre-insolvency stage. Generally, the impairment
of creditors’ rights is permitted without consent. 343 But most important, the
reorganization plan may permanently impair shareholders’ rights. 344 Assets
may be sold or temporarily transferred, 345 equity may be increased while
pre-emptive rights of shareholders are excluded from any increase, 346 and
debt may be converted into equity (debt-equity swap). 347 The conversion of
debt into equity does, however, always require explicit creditor consent. 348
In addition, the German law includes a potentially controversial
provision, allowing appropriate compensation of shareholders in case of
impairment. 349 While a court-appointed expert determines the amount of
compensation, 350 this procedure may run counter to the motives of the
law. 351 Time is of the essence in any bank reorganization and the
appointment of an expert may significantly slow down the procedure,
making it less effective. Waiting for court approval may take time as will
the analysis of shareholders’ claims by the expert. This is even more
important as it is doubtful that creditors, at any time, may receive more than
the value of their claims. Moreover, the impairment of shareholder rights
generally seems appropriate when creditors’ rights are also written down or

avoid class-action suits. Whether or not this will be successful seems questionable,
specifically knowing that any systemically relevant financial institution may have a vast
number of creditors who are neither members of a protected class or may have any protected
claims. See Schuster &Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 227.
343
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 8(3) (Ger.).
344
Id. at §§ 9–11.
345
Id. § 11(1). See also Aktiengesetz [AktG][German Company Law], Sept. 6, 1965,
BGBL. I at 1089, § 179(Ger.).
346
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 9(1) (Ger.).
347
Id.
348
Id. Creditors’ consent may not be replaced by majority vote of its class in the
creditors’ committee. Cramdown is not permitted. Furthermore, the limit on hold-out in §
19(1) does not apply. Regardless, it is debatable whether consent may be replaced if the debt
instrument includes provisions permitting decision-making by majority vote in accordance
with the Gesetz über Schuldverschreibungen aus Gesamtemissionen [SchVG] [Law on the
Issuance of Debentures], July 31, 2009, BGBL. I at 2512, § 5(3), No. 5, as amended (Ger.).
The majority vote under SchVG, § 5(4), does require a qualified vote of 75% of creditors
entitled to vote, which goes beyond the simple majority vote required under KredReorgG,
19(1). Id. At the same time, while SchVG, §19 refers to the German Bankruptcy Code in
case of insolvency, SchVG does not include any reference to the KredReorgG. See also
Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 227 (arguing in favor of filling the described gap
through contract law and private ordering).
349
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL.I at 1900, § 9(2) (Ger.).
350
Id.
351
Id.; see also Obermüller & Kuder, supra note 297, at 2019.
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otherwise impaired. 352
Like the stabilization procedure, the reorganization procedure also
requires a voluntary petition. 353 The financial institution must petition the
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, 354 submit a reorganization plan,
and nominate a trustee (Reorganisationsberater). 355 After being notified,
the Supervisory Authority must review the petition. The Authority has the
discretion to submit the petition to the competent court after it determines
that the existence of the financial institution is in danger, and that failure
carries the risk of contagion and endangers the stability of the entire
financial system. 356
Under the German Banking Act, 357 a bank is deemed to be in danger of
failure if the financial institution’s own funds, 358 core capital, 359 or modified
available funds or liquidity 360 have fallen below 90% of the required
thresholds 361 or if there is reason to believe that failure to comply with the
required thresholds is imminent. 362 The German Banking Act provides five
non-exhaustive examples for determining the risk of contagion and
systemic threat. 363 The Financial Supervisory Authority may consider: (1)

352
See, e.g., Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der
Sanierung von Unternehmen [ESUG] [Draft Legislation of the German Government, Law to
Simplify the Reorganization of Corportions], Feb. 23, 2011, § 245(3), No. 1, available at
http://www.bmj.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/pdfs/RegE_ESUG_23022011.pdf?__blob=p
ublicationFile.
353
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 7 (Ger.).
354
Id. § 7(1).
355
Id. § 7(5).
356
Id. § 7(2).
357
Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I
at 2776.
358
Id. § 48b(1), no. 1 (“Going-concern risk shall be presumed to exist if (1) the available
tier 1 capital represents less than 90 per cent of the tier 1 capital required pursuant to section
10(1) . . .”).
359
Id. § 48b(1), no. 2 (“Going-concern risk shall be presumed to exist if. . .(2) the
modified available capital represents less than 90 per cent of the own funds required
pursuant to section 10(1) . . .”).
360
Id. § 48b(1), no. 3 (“Going-concern risk shall be presumed to exist if. . .(3) the liquid
assets available to the institution in a maturity band defined by the statutory order pursuant
to section 11(1) and sentence 2 represent less than 90 per cent of the payment obligations
that are callable in the same maturity band, or . . .”).
361
Id. § 48b(1), nos. 1–3.
362
Id. § 48b(1), no. 4 (“Going-concern risk shall be presumed to exist if. . .(4) the facts
are known which warrant the assumption that a shortfall pursuant to numbers 1, 2 and 3 will
occur if no corrective measures are taken; this is the case, in particular if a loss may be
anticipated based on the institution’s earnings situation, as a result of which the conditions of
numbers 1, 2, or 3 would be met.”).
363
Id. § 48b(2) (“Systemic risk shall be deemed to exist if there is concern that the credit
institution’s going-concern risk could have a significantly negative impact on other financial
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the nature and amount of the bank’s liabilities toward other financial
institutions, 364 (2) the amount of deposits, 365 (3) the nature, amount and risk
composition assumed by the bank while taking current and relevant market
conditions into consideration, 366 (4) the bilateral netting of the bank, 367 and
(5) the financial market conditions and possible consequences of any failure
for other financial institutions, the financial market, and the confidence in
the stability of the financial markets by depositors and other market
participants. 368
Given this weighting, the German Banking Act seems to primarily
consider the violation of regulatory requirements for the determination of
system relevance and contagion but does not necessarily emphasize
insolvency. This is very similar to the stabilization procedure under the
SRR of the British Banking Act of 2009. Of further importance is the
German focus on market reception and confidence in the viability of a
financial institution. 369 The German law does not stipulate any threshold
conditions or determining factors for market reception or confidence. As a
result, it will always be difficult to determine any of these factors in a
reliable and objective manner. In addition, while the Supervisory Authority
has broad discretion to determine the merit of a petition under the
reorganization procedure, 370 it is unclear 371 whether the Supervisory
Authority will have the sole discretion to determine a threat or whether it
will have to consult the German Central Bank. 372 In this context, while the
German legislature was influenced by the British Banking Act of 2009, it
did not develop a similar system of tripartite supervisory authorities or a
system similar to the “three key turns” under Dodd-Frank. 373
sector enterprises, on the financial markets or on the general confidence of depositors and
other market participants in the proper functioning of the financial system. Particular account
shall be taken of: (1) the nature and scope of the credit institution’s liabilities to other
institutions and other financial sector enterprises, (2) the volume of the deposits received by
the institution, (3) the nature, scope and composition of the risks entered into by the
institution as well as the conditions on the markets on which such positions are traded, (4)
interconnectedness with other financial market participants, (5) the conditions on the
financial markets, in particular the consequences which market participants expect the
institution’s collapse to have on other financial sector enterprises, on the financial market
and on the confidence of depositors and market participants in the proper functioning of the
financial market.”).
364
Id. § 48b(2), no. 1.
365
Id. § 48b(2), no. 2.
366
Id. § 48b(2), no. 3.
367
Id. § 48b(2), no. 4.
368
Id. § 48b(2), no. 5.
369
Id.
370
See Gesetzentwurf Sept. 27, 2010, BT 17/3024 (Ger.).
371
Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 225.
372
Id.
373
See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 1, at 130 (explaining the concept of the “Three key turn”
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If the Financial Supervisory Authority determines that the
requirements for the reorganization procedure are fulfilled, it submits the
petition to the competent court. 374 The court must consider whether the
requirements of the procedure have been met, including the formal
requirements of the reorganization plan, such as the establishment of the
creditors’ committees and their voting rights. 375 After a hearing in which
the Supervisory Authority, the German Central Bank, and the petitioning
financial institution are heard, the court may issue a declaratory order
establishing that the petitioning bank is in danger of failing with a risk of
contagion. Simultaneously the court may also order the immediate
reorganization and appoint the trustee (Reorganisationsberater). 376 All
court orders are sealed and the hearings are conducted in private. 377 In
addition, the court may stay termination rights of all obligations and
contracts, such as derivatives, swaps or repurchasing agreements. The stay
starts on the date of the initial petition to the Financial Supervisory
Authority and terminates at the end of the next business day following that
petition date. 378 Assuming the petition was filed on a Friday, termination
rights and close-out-netting may be stayed for up to 96 hours. 379
The reorganization plan is comparable to a Chapter 11 plan, but yet
as part of the basic framework of bail-out under the Dodd-Frank Act); but see Gesetz über
das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I at 2776, §§ 8–8e.
374
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 7(5) (Ger.) (“Soweit für das
Reorganisationsverfahren nichts anderes bestimmt ist, gelten die Vorschriften über das
Sanierungsverfahren entsprechend. § 46d Absatz 1 bis 4 des Kreditwesengesetzes gilt
entsprechend. Für Kreditinstitute, die in anderer Rechtsform als einer Aktiengesellschaft
verfasst sind, gelten die folgenden Vorschriften sinngemäß.”).
375
Id. § 7(1), (5).
376
The trustee, in analogy to the stabilization procedure, may be installed as a member of
the management of the failing financial institution. At the same time, part of the trustee’s
role is to work toward and help in the acceptance of the reorganization plan. This establishes
a hybrid role of the trustee that is very similar to the debtor in possession (DIP) under U.S.
Bankruptcy Law. While this has been very successful in the United States, many in Europe
continue to fear a conflict of interest. See, e.g., Frank Frind, Unabhängigkeit – Kein Wert
Mehr an Sich? - Die Auswahl und Berufliche Stellung des Insolvenzverwalters Nach den
Neuen Regelungsentwürfen zur Änderung der InsO, NZI 705 (2010).
377
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 22(3) (Ger.).
378
Id. § 13.
379
Id. (“Schuldverhältnisse mit dem Kreditinstitut können ab dem Tag der Anzeige nach
§ 7 Absatz 1 bis zum Ablauf des folgenden Geschäftstages im Sinne des § 1 Absatz 16b des
Kreditwesengesetzes nicht beendet werden. Eine Kündigung gegenüber dem Kreditinstitut
ist in diesem Zeitraum ausgeschlossen. Die Wirkung sonstiger in diesem Zeitraum
eintretender Beendigungstatbestände ist bis zu seinem Ablauf aufgeschoben. Abweichende
Vereinbarungen sind unwirksam . . .”). Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German
Banking Act] Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I at 2776, 16(b) (“Der Geschäftstag eines Systems
umfasst Tag und Nachtabrechnungen und beinhaltet alle Ereignisse innerhalb des üblichen
Geschäftszyklus eines Systems.”).
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different. The trustee verifies creditors’ claims, but he also directly contacts
the creditors informing them of their rights. The plan requires the
establishment of a creditor committee consisting of various creditor classes.
Generally, the plan is drawn up by the creditors and may include the
transfer of assets or even the liquidation of the bank.
Plan approval requires a simple majority of all creditors in each class
and a majority exceeding 50% of the sum of the claims in each class. 380 If a
class of creditors objects to the plan, the objecting class can be crammed
down. However, cramdown is only possible if the majority of all other
classes have approved the plan. Regardless of cram down, the objecting
class is allowed an adequate share in the distribution of the plan, 381 where
the principle of “no creditor worse-off than in liquidation” applies. 382
As a separate class, shareholders are also required to approve the
plan. 383 The trustee convenes an extraordinary shareholder meeting during
which the plan is approved. 384 Shareholder approval requires a simple
majority vote of the attending shareholders if no pre-emptive rights or
equity positions are impaired by the plan. 385 If the latter is the case, either a
two-thirds majority of the attending shareholders or a simple majority of the
shareholders representing 50% of the share capital is required. 386 Should
shareholders reject the plan a cramdown option is also available.387
Shareholder approval is assumed if the majority of all classes of creditors
approved the plan. 388
Once approved by the creditor committee, the court confirms the plan
and concludes the reorganization procedure. 389 This is similar to the
Chapter 11 reorganization procedure 390 but unlike the stabilization
procedure in which the trustee has the power and responsibility to initiate
conclusion proceedings. 391

380
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 22(3) (Ger.).
381
Id. § 19(2).
382
Id.
383
Id. § 18.
384
Id. § 18(2). The main reason to require a shareholder meeting is the European Union
Council Directive 77/91, 1976 O.J. (L 26) 1 (EC) and various European Court of Justice
cases, e.g., Case C-19/90 & C-20/90, Karella v. Minister for Indus., Energy, and Tech., 1991
E.C.R. I-2691; Case C-381/89, Syndesmos v. The Greek State, 1992 E.C.R. I-2111; Case C441/93, Pafitis v. Trapeza Kentrikis Ellados AE, 1996 E.C.R. I-1347.
385
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 18(3) (Ger.).
386
Id.
387
Id. § 19(4) (cramdown).
388
Id.
389
Id. § 22(1).
390
U.S. Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (2006).
391
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
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(b) Regulatory intervention powers and procedures
The amendments to the German Banking Act 392 significantly increase
the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority’s (BaFin) intervention
powers. 393 The Supervisory Authority will likely exercise primary
oversight over the reorganization of systemically relevant banks by relying
on the powers established in these amendments, including the involuntary
petition for reorganization. Furthermore, in context of these increased
powers the likelihood that any systemically important bank may file a
voluntary petition under the German stabilization or reorganization
procedure seems remote at best. This is confirmed by the fact that the
German Banking Act, unlike the German Financial Institutions
Reorganization Act, also applies to groups of financial institutions,394
financial holdings, 395 and conglomerates 396 headquartered in Germany.

Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 6(3) (Ger.).
392
Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I
at 2776.
393
Dirk Auerbach & Kristen Donner, Änderungen bei den aufsichtlichen
Eingriffinstrumenten des KWG durch das Restrukturierungsgesetz, DER BETRIEB, Jan. 4,
2011, at 17.
394
Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I
at 2776, § 480 (“Measures relating to subordinated enterprises of groups of institutions”).
395
Id. § 48p (“Measures at financial holding groups”).
396
Id. § 48q (“Measures at financial conglomerates”).
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The intervention powers of the Authority are very broad 397 and include
a variety of new reporting duties 398 and supervisory powers. 399 For
example, the Authority may prohibit or limit withdrawals and distribution
of profits, 400 prohibit or limit balance sheet measures to offset net loss or
show net profit, 401 limit payments of returns on funds, 402 order risk
reduction as it relates to certain types of activities, 403 prohibit or limit the
payment of bonuses, 404 and require a financial institution to draft a
restructuring plan. 405
Under the new law the Authority may also transfer part or all of the
systemically relevant assets from a distressed bank to a bridge bank. 406
397
Auerbach & Donner, supra note 393, at 17–18; Stengel, supra note 330, at 15; Höche,
supra note 7, at 53.
398
See, e.g., Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998,
BGBL. I at 2776, § 45(1), no. 1 (providing that BaFin may order the institution “to produce a
substantiated description of the development of its key business activity over a period of at
least three years, including projected balance sheets and projected profit and loss accounts,
as well as of the development of its prudential ratios and to submit said description to BaFin
and the Deutsche Bundesbank”).
399
Id. § 45(1), nos. 2–4 (providing that BaFin may order the institution “to review
measures for improving protection against or reducing the material risks identified by the
institution and the associated risk concentrations and to report these to BaFin and the
Deutsche Bundesbank, including consideration of strategies for exiting from individual
business areas or severing the institution or group entities”).
400
Id. § 45(2), no. 1 (providing that under certain circumstances, BaFin can “prohibit or
limit withdrawals by the proprietors or partners and the distribution of profits”).
401
Id. § 45(2), no. 2 (providing that under certain circumstances, BaFin can “prohibit or
limit balance sheet measures that serve to offset a net loss or to show a net profit”).
402
Id. § 45(2), no. 3 (providing that under certain circumstances, BaFin can “order that
the payment of all types of returns on own funds instruments apart from those pursuant to
section 10(5a) be fully or partly waived without replacement if they are not fully covered by
a net profit for the year”).
403
Id. § 45(2), no. 5 (providing that under certain circumstances, BaFin can “order the
institution to take measures to reduce risks insofar as they arise from certain types of
activities and products or through the use of certain systems”).
404
Id. § 45(2), no. 6 (providing that under certain circumstances, BaFin can “prohibit the
payment of variable remuneration components or limit such payment to a certain proportion
of the net result for the year; this shall not apply to variable remuneration components
specified in a collective agreement or, within its scope of application, in an agreement
between the social partners applying the provisions of the collective agreement, or on the
basis of a collective agreement, in a plant-level or service agreement”).
405
Id. § 45(2), no. 7. BaFin also has the power under KWG § 45c(1) to appoint a special
administrator or trustee (“Sonderbeauftragter”) who may directly participate in the corporate
governance of the failing bank and may even replace the CEO of the bank. Id. § 45c(1).
See, e.g., Auerbach & Donner, supra note 393, at 18–20.
406
The concept of asset transfer is not new under German law and follows a similar
concept established for insurance companies and mortgage lenders. See Gesetz über die
Beaufsichtigung der Versicherungsunternehmen [VAG] [Insurance Act], Dec. 17, 1992,
BGBL I at 2, as amended Mar. 1, 2011, § 14 (Ger.); Pfandbriefgesetz [PfandBG] [German
Mortgage Banking Law], May 22, 2005, BGBL. I at 1373, as amended, § 32 (Ger.). Under
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Toxic assets and additional liabilities may be left behind in the residual or
bad bank, which will be liquidated. A transfer order can only be executed if
the financial “institution’s viability as a going concern is jeopardized
(going-concern risk)” 407 and the stability of the financial system is
threatened. 408 In addition, the order must be necessary. The transfer cannot
be ordered if the systemic risk could be avoided in an equally certain
manner in any other way. 409 The Authority has discretion to set a deadline
before issuing any transfer order. 410 If a deadline is set, the failing bank
must present a viable recovery plan before the end of the deadline. The
plan must show that the bank is able to avert the going-concern risk within
6 weeks after the deadline and prove that long-term viability is certain. The
plan must also include proof of adequate funding and sufficient liquidity.411
Considering the turmoil of the financial crisis, it is doubtful that the
Authority will ever have the privilege to exercise this discretion as time will
be of the essence to prevent contagion. 412
A bridge bank is required to be a legal person 413 headquartered in
Germany 414 and must fulfill the same legal requirements that apply to the
organization of the distressed or transferring bank. 415 The bridge bank may
be any financial institution willing to participate in the rescue of the failing

the VAG and the PfandBG a transfer requires a contractual agreement between transferee
and transferor. This is not required under the KWG
407
Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL.I
at 2776, § 48a(2), no. 1.
408
Id.
409
Id. § 48a(2), no. 2 (“the systemic risk arising from going concern risk cannot be
eliminated in an equally certain manner in any other way than through the transfer order.”).
410
Id. § 48c(1) (“If the risk situation persists, BaFin can, before issuing the transfer order,
set the credit institution a time limit within which the credit institution must present a viable
plan indicating in what way going-concern risk will be averted (recovery plan).”). See also
Manuel Lorenz, Der Regierungsentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Restrukturierung und geordneten
Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten – Überblick und erste Einordnung, 13 Neue Zeitschrift für
Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG], 1046, 1051 (2010).
411
Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL.I
at 2776, § 48a(2), no. 2 (Ger.).
412
See, Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 283.
413
Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I
at 2776, § 48c(5), no. 1 (“The transfer order shall not specify a legal entity as the transferee
legal entity if (1) the legal entity is not constituted in the form of a legal person.”).
414
Id. § 48c(5), no. 2 (“the legal entity has its head office outside Germany”). It is highly
questionable whether this requirement conforms to the Law of the European Union, namely
the principal of free movement of capital, TFEU, art. 63.
415
Id. (“If the credit institution is constituted in the legal form of a corporation, the
transferee legal entity shall be constituted in the same legal form.”). See also id. § 48g(6)
(“Where the transferee legal entity does not have the authorisation required pursuant to
section 32 to maintain the transferred operations as a going concern, the transfer order shall
be deemed to be authorisation for the transferee legal entity with the same scope as the
authorisation granted to the credit institution.”).
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bank or, in the alternative, the bridge bank may be specifically organized as
a special purpose vehicle under government control. 416 The bridge bank
must consent to any transfer of assets and must give consideration to the
distressed bank if the overall value of transferred assets is positive. 417
Generally, the consideration will include shares of the bridge bank, but may
also consist of cash. 418 However, because the required consideration must
only be commensurate with the value of the transferred assets, 419 there may
often be significant disagreements over the issue of valuation. 420 This is of
particular significance if shares of the bridge bank are given as
consideration requiring the need to evaluate the value of the bridge bank as
well. 421 The calculation of the value of the transferred assets may not,
however, include support payments from public sources or include
payments provided as part of any public bail-out. 422 Conversely, if the
value of the transferred assets is negative, the distressed or residual bank is
required to compensate the bridge bank in cash. 423

416

Gesetz zur Einrichtung eines Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute [RStrukFG]
[Law Establishing the Restructuring Fund for Financial Institutions], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I
1900, 1921, as amended §§ 5–7 (Ger.); see also Karsten Müller-Eising et al., supra note 330,
at 69.
417
Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I
at 2776, § 48d(1) (The transfer order shall provide for a consideration to the credit institution
if the overall value of the assets to be transferred is positive. The consideration shall consist
of capital shares in the transferee legal entity. If granting capital shares is unreasonable for
the transferee legal entity or threatens to defeat the purpose of the transfer order, the
consideration shall be determined in cash.).
418
Id.
419
Id. at § 48d(2).
420
Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 284.
421
Id.; see also Gregor Bachmann, Das neue Restrukturierungsrecht der Kreditinstitute,
Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft [ZBB] 459, 467 (2010).
422
Gesetz über das Kreditwesen [KWG] [German Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I
at 2776, § 48d(2) (At the time at which the transfer order is issued, the consideration must be
commensurate with the value of the transferred assets. Any support payments from the
Restructuring Fund or government agencies that were provided or promised to avert or
overcome the going-concern risk shall not be taken into consideration in the credit
institution’s favor. Central bank operations that are concluded on standard terms and
conditions do not constitute support payments within the meaning of sentence 2.).
423
Id. § 48d(6) (Where the aggregate value of the assets to be transferred is negative, the
transfer order shall stipulate that the credit institution must compensate the transferee legal
entity in cash (compensation liability). The maturity and insolvency seniority of the
compensation liability shall be based on the maturity and seniority of the liabilities included
in the spin-off. In the case of differing maturities or seniority levels, the relationship of the
liabilities with different maturity or seniority levels to one another shall be the determining
factor. Subsections (2) to (4) shall apply mutatis mutandis.).
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After the transfer is complete and effective, the bridge bank is jointly
and severally liable to all creditors; 424 the liability includes both the
transferred assets as well as those assets remaining with the distressed
bank. 425 Regardless, the liability of the bridge bank is limited to the amount
of the claim a creditor would have received in a liquidation of the distressed
bank prior to the transfer. 426 Furthermore, the bridge bank is only liable to
the extent that creditors cannot satisfy their claims through the distressed
bank. 427
The effectiveness of the transfer may also trigger additional
supervisory powers for the Supervisory Authority. For example, the
Authority may direct and instruct the distressed bank on how to exercise the
voting rights on the shares received as consideration from the bridge
424

Id. § 48h(1) (The credit institution shall be liable for the liabilities included in the
spin-off only in the amount of the sum which the creditor would have received had the credit
institution been wound up and no spin-off had taken place. Liability shall exist only to the
extent that the creditor cannot obtain satisfaction from the transferee legal entity.).
425
Id. § 48k(3) (Notwithstanding § 48e(1), the transfer order may stipulate that only part
of the assets, liabilities and legal relationships shall be transferred to the transferee legal
entity (partial transfer). In this case, notwithstanding § 48e(1) no. 2, the transfer order shall
specify only those spin-off assets that are covered by the spin-off; alternatively, it may
specify those spin-off assets that will remain with the institution.).
426
Id. § 48h(1).
427
Id.
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bank. 428 In addition, the bridge bank shares can only be sold or transferred
after approval by the Authority, 429 and the Authority has the power to
monitor the viability of the transferred business assets. 430
(c) The Law Establishing the Reorganization Fund for Financial
Institutions
The German Banking Reorganization Act of 2010 also established a
reorganization
fund
(the
fund)
for
financial
institutions
(Restrukturierungsfondsgesetz). 431 The fund is a so-called Federal Special
Fund established under Art. 110, section 1 of the German Constitution
(Grundgesetz) and is part of the Federal Agency for Financial Market
Stabilization (FMSA). 432 The fund has no legal rights, but has the capacity
to sue and be sued. 433 The purpose of the fund is the stabilization of
financial markets in Germany. 434 As part of its powers, the fund is charged
with establishing bridge banks and initiating public ownership in these
bridge banks, if necessary. 435 The fund also guarantees claims against any
bridge bank 436 and may provide funding for bridge banks. 437 In order to
avoid issues of moral hazard and public bail-out, financial institutions do
not have a legal claim for support payment from the fund. Rather, only
bridge banks or private sector banks that aid in the recovery of a distressed
bank may receive financial support from the fund. 438
The most controversial issues surrounding the establishment of the
fund is the source of its funding and its size. While the Federal Ministry of
Justice can supplement the available funds with loan guarantees of up to 20

428
Id. § 48l(2) (“BaFin can instruct the credit institution to exercise the voting rights to
which it is entitled at the shareholders’ meeting of the transferee legal entity in a particular
manner . . .”).
429
Id. § 48l(3) (“[T]he credit institution may not, without prior written permission from
BaFin, dispose of the capital shares in the transferee legal entity to which it is entitled.”).
430
Id. § 48m(1) (“On request, the transferee legal entity shall promptly provide BaFin
with information on all circumstances required to assess the viability of restructuring for the
business units transferred to the transferee legal entity.”).
431
Gesetz zur Einrichtung eines Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute [RStrukFG]
[Law Establishing the Restructuring Fund for Financial Institutions], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I
at 1900 (Ger.) [hereinafter [RStrukFG] [Restructuring Fund Law]].
432
Id. § 1.
See also Satzung der Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilisierung
[FMSASatz] [Statute of the Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilization] Feb. 21,
2011, BGBL. I at 272, §§ 1–3 (Ger.).
433
[RStrukFG] [Restructuring Fund Law] § 9.
434
Id. § 3(1).
435
Id. § 5.
436
Id. § 6.
437
Id. § 7.
438
Id. § 4. See also Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 2, at 287.
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million euro, 439 the reorganization fund is primarily financed by means of a
bank levy on all German banks. 440 The German government assessed the
rates of these bank levies for the first time in July of 2011. 441 The proposed
levies are re-evaluated each year and rise in line with the business volume
of each bank. 442 Financial institutions with liabilities of up to 300 million
euro do not contribute any funds. 443 Banks with a business volume above
300 million euros must contribute two basis points with a maximum of six
will be levied on each bank. 444 In addition, banks’ open futures rates will
account for 0.03 basis points of the levy. 445
The German levy system is problematic because financial institutions
without systemic relevance are required to contribute to the fund, yet are
not able to receive fund support payments. 446 The fact that all banks,
regardless of systematic relevance, will at least indirectly benefit from
stable financial markets by avoiding another crisis is the only possible
argument in support of a general levy requirement. The levy may also
impact the competitiveness of German banks in more general terms,
especially if German banks with subsidiaries or branches in other European
countries are required to contribute to rescue funds in these other countries.
As a result, a more harmonized, Union-wide solution could be preferable.
Another point of contention is the size of the fund with a maximum volume
of 70 billion euros. 447 It is questionable if this amount will suffice during a
financial crisis. The availability of these funds and the time it will take to
raise them is of even greater concern. 448
IV. CONTINGENT CAPITAL IN BANK RESTRUCTURING
Policy makers and legislative bodies in Europe and the United
States 449 are increasingly recognizing the possible use of contingent
439

[RStrukFG] [Restructuring Fund Law], § 12(6).
Id. § 2.
441
Press Release, Federal Ministry of Justice, Cabinet Adopts Restructuring Fund
Ordinance (July 21, 2011) (Ger.), available at http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.
de/nn_103466/EN/Topics/Financial-markets/Articles/20110721-RestructuringFund.html?__nnn=true.
442
Id.
443
Id.
444
Id.
445
Id.
446
See also Wolfgang Schön, Alexander Hellgardt, & Christine Osterloh-Konrad,
Bankenabgabe und Verfassungsrecht – Teil I: Verfassungsrechtliche Zulässigkeit als
Sonderabgabe, WM - Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht, 2010, 2145 (Ger.).
447
Gesetz zur Einrichtung eines Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute [RStrukFG]
[Law Establishing the Restructuring Fund for Financial Institutions], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I
at 1900, § 12(10) (Ger.).
448
See, e.g., Stengel, supra note 330, at 16.
449
Edmund L. Andrews, Bernanke, in Nod to Critics, Suggests Board of Regulators,
440
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capital. 450 One of the main benefits of contingent capital could be its role in
helping to avoid insolvency and stabilizing financial markets. Although
many academics support the use of contingent capital, disagreements on the
design features 451 and the mandatory or voluntary nature of contingent
capital persist. 452 Determining the optimal design features of contingent
capital may require a concerted effort of policy-makers worldwide. A
common denominator on how to use contingent capital to avoid a future
crisis could be, generally speaking, for a financial institution to issue a

N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at B3 (quoting Bernanke stating, “that giant financial players
might be forced to adopt contingent capital,” and noting that the contingent capital is
“gaining popularity within the Fed.”); Daniel K. Tarullo, Federal Reserve Governor, Speech
at the Exchequer Club in Washington, D.C. to the Federal Reserve: Confronting Too Big to
Fail (Oct. 21, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
tarullo20091021a.htm (commenting that contingent capital is an effort “worth pursuing”). In
the E.U., see IP/11/915, supra note 8 (“The proposal will require banks to hold more and
better capital to resist future shocks by themselves.” The proposal also translates the bank
capital agreed to in the Basel III agreement.).
450
CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, at arts. 48–52.
451
Coffee, supra note 26, at 806 (promoting contingent capital as an alternative to
bankruptcy or bail-outs, Coffee suggests a contingent capital design where “(1) the
conversion ratio would be deliberately designed to protect the debt holders from loss by
instead diluting the existing equity holders; and (2) the debt security would convert into a
fixed return preferred stock with cumulative arrearages and significant voting rights.”);
FLANNERY, supra note 24; Robert L. McDonald, Contingent Capital with a Dual Price
Trigger 20 (Northwestern University Kellogg Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper, Apr. 11,
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553430; George Pennacchi, A Structural Model
of Contingent Bank Capital (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper 10-04, Apr.
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1595080); George Pennacchi et al., Contingent
Capital: The Case for COERCs 9, 13 (INSEAD Working Paper No. 2010/89/FIN, Oct. 27,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1656994; Squam
Lake Working Group, supra note 24, at 4 (2009); Suresh Sundaresan & Zhenyu Wang,
Design of Contingent Capital with a Stock Price Trigger for Mandatory Conversion 4 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of N.Y., Working Paper, Apr. 30, 2010), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/economists/wang/BankDebtTrigger.pdf (recognizing
that a value transfer between equity and contingent capital “disturbs equilibrium by moving
the stock price up or down, depending on the conversion ratio specified,” and that the
proposals typically ensure that there is no value transfer at maturity, but do not ensure there
is no transfer before maturity).
452
Coffee, supra note 26, at 808 (“[W]ork even when regulatory oversight fails and a
crisis sneaks in under the regulators’ radar screen.”); Letter Comment from Mary Frances
Monroe, Vice President, Office of Regulatory Policy, American Bankers Association, to
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 3 (Oct. 1, 2010) (on file with Am. Bankers Ass’n)
(Mandatory contingent capital would “hinder unduly the flexibility of banks to create a
capital structure that best meets the needs of the bank and its investors . . . . Other banks
may not be able to, or may find it inefficient to, issue contingent or convertible instruments
for a variety of reasons – including, for instance, restrictions under their chartering
instruments, tax issues related to the deductibility of payments on the instruments, lack of
market access, or insufficient investor interest. These banks should not be harmed by a
perception that they are not as well capitalized as others simply because they need to or
choose to meet their capital needs through other acceptable channels.”).
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certain percentage of its long-term debt capital as convertible debt securities
that convert into equity when triggered at the point of financial weakening
of the financial institution. 453
Among the potential benefits of implementing contingent capital is the
minimization of moral hazard, avoidance of financial contagion, and
limitation of systemic risk by financial institutions that may be too big to
fail. Contingent capital is an automatic mechanism for increasing capital
while reducing debt with the long-term benefit of lowering leverage.
Contingent capital may also support general risk control in financial
institutions 454 and may contribute to minimizing moral hazard by holding
shareholders responsible and internalizing bank failure costs. Moreover,
given the threat of loss due to conversion and the implicit dilution of stock
holdings, contingent capital has the potential to reduce incentives for
shareholders to encourage management to take higher risks for higher
returns.
Using contingent capital may also be less expensive and less time
consuming than bankruptcy and could establish a preferable mix of
incentives by creating ownership stakes in the holders of contingent capital.
The holders of contingent capital may become actively involved in the
reorganization of the financial institution after contingent capital has been
converted. Comparing contingent capital to equity, contingent capital could
be cheaper, provided the interest expense is deemed tax deductible. It
would be a non-dilutive form of financing that would not bring the threat of
change of control with it. If deemed tax deductible, the tax advantages of
contingent capital are likely the same as those in debt financing. Tax
authorities may also treat contingent capital as a hybrid.

453

Coffee, supra note 26, at 795, 833; McDonald, supra note 451;FLANNERY, supra note

24.
454

Raghuram G. Rajan, Too Systemic to Fail: Consequences, Causes, and Potential
Remedies 28 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, BIS Working Paper No. 305, Mar. 2010), available
at http://www.bis.org/publ/work305.pdf (“[I]nstalling sprinklers . . . .
When the fire
threatens, the sprinklers will turn on.”). Contra Christian Koziol & Jochen Lawrenz,
Contingent Convertibles: Solving or Seeding the Next Banking Crisis?, J. BANKING & FIN. 5,
35 (2011) (Koziol and Lawrenz suggest that CoCo bonds may “create negative externalities,
in the sense that the (destabilizing) risk-shifting problem induced by CoCo bonds may
overcompensate the (stabilizing) effect of providing a pre-committed recapitalization to
banks.” Through the use of a “dynamic continuous-time framework,” the authors conclude
that ”the beneficial impact of CoCo bonds crucially hinges on the assumption if bank
managers have substantial discretion over the bank’s business risk.” The authors contend
that if complete contracts can be written, CoCos are clearly beneficial, however, if allowing
for incomplete contracts, the authors argue that “CoCo bonds always distort risk taking
incentives. Therefore, equity holders have incentives to take excessive risks. Thus, CoCos
may be an example where individually rational decisions can have systemically undesirable
outcomes.”).
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A. European Commission Proposal
The European Commission has proposed a framework for prevention,
crisis management and bank resolution. 455 The Commission issued a
working document for discussion and consultation purposes, 456 which
distinguishes between a comprehensive and targeted approach. 457 The
Commission also proposed the recognition of contingent capital as
“Additional Tier 1 instruments.” 458
Analogous to the FSB 459 and the Vickers Report, 460 the European
Commission proposed haircuts for all equity supplemented by a debt
conversion of both subordinated and senior debt at a point when the
financial institution is in danger of insolvency. In other words, the
Commission recognizes the benefits of contingent capital but only as a
supplement to a system of regulatory write-down tools or bail-inables. The
Commission presupposes a statutory power to write down subordinated
debt and to convert subordinate debt into equity. 461 It is in this latter
context that the European Commission has proposed its comprehensive and
targeted approach for supplementary debt write-down tools.
Under the comprehensive approach, national resolution authorities
could be given a statutory power to write down or convert to equity “all
senior debt deemed necessary to ensure the credit institution is returned to
solvency” upon the occurrence of a pre-defined trigger event. 462 Under this
proposal, national resolution authorities would also have the discretion to
determine which classes of debt would be converted or written down and at
what conversion rate. 463 In addition, the size of the write down would
depend on the financial situation of the institution, its assets and liabilities,

455

The Internal Market and Services Directorate General (DG MARKT) is one of the
directorates which make up the European Commission. A main role of the DG Market is to
coordinate the Commission’s policy on the European Single Market. Its primary function is
to seek the removal of unjustified obstacles to trade and in the field of services and financial
markets. See, DG Internal Market and Services, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
internal_market/index_en.htm (April 14, 2012).
456
DG Working Document, supra note 10.
457
Id.
458
CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10.
459
FIN. STABILITY BD., REDUCING THE MORAL HAZARD POSED BY SYSTEMICALLY
IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: FSB RECOMMENDATIONS AND TIME LINES 1 (Oct.
2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101111a.pdf
(noting that the risk associated with SIFIs includes moral hazard – their interconnectedness
can cause “significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity.”).
460
U.K. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT: CONSULTATION ON
REFORM OPTIONS 180–81 (Apr. 2011), available at http://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/
htcdn/Interim-Report-110411.pdf.
461
DG Working Paper, supra note 10, at 87.
462
Id.
463
Id.
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and the amount of funds needed to restore viability and maintain market
confidence. 464 The Commission argues that the proper functioning of credit
markets requires that short-term debt, as defined by a specified maximum
maturity, 465 swap repo and derivative counterparties, other trade creditors,
as well as retail and wholesale deposits and secured debt should be
excluded. 466 In summary, the Commission considers the comprehensive
approach adequate to “create maximum flexibility for the resolution
authorities to return an institution to viability, install new management, and
implement a recovery or restructuring plan to retain market confidence and
access to funding.” 467
The alternative to the comprehensive approach is the targeted
approach. 468 Under the targeted approach national resolution authorities
would require financial institutions to issue a fixed amount of debt that prequalifies for write-down or conversion to equity on a pre-defined statutory
trigger. 469 The Commission suggests that the pre-qualified amount of debt
could include a fixed minimum for all institutions between 4 and 19 per
Although these numbers seem
cent of risk-weighted assets. 470
unrealistically high, the Commission seems to justify the proposal with an
attempt to ensure that “debt contracts are not able [to] evolve in a way that
would reduce the effectiveness of the regime and would provide certainty
for both the institution and creditors about what would happen in a
resolution.” 471
The European Banking Authority (EBA) will most likely play a
dominant role in ensuring that similar and consistent treatment of
prequalified debt is harmonized at the level of the European Union. Some
commentators have suggested that the market reaction to the European
Commission proposal was negative. 472 Uncertainties regarding knock-oneffect and interaction with other proposals (including Basel III) are among

464

Id. at 88.
Contra Coffee, supra note 26, at 833 (arguing that the amount of contingent capital
that should be triggered ought to be defined by short-term debt).
466
DG Working Paper, supra note 10, at 88.
467
Id.
468
Id. at 89.
469
Id. (“[s]uch debt would need to include a contractual term which would specify that
the relevant resolution authority could use a statutory power to write down the debt when the
institution meets the trigger conditions for entry into resolution.”).
470
Id. n. 24.
471
Id. at 89.
472
EUROPEAN BANKING FEDERATION (EBF), POSITIONING IN RESPECT OF THE EU
COMMISSION CONSULTATION ON TECHNICAL DETAILS FOR A POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR
BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION 1, 5, 53–61 (Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.ebffbe.eu/uploads/documents/positions/BankingReg/3%20March%20201-EBF_Response_to_
COM_Crisis_Management_Consultation%20%28final%29.pdf.
465
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the most serious open questions. 473 Given the complexities that contingent
capital presents from a regulatory and taxation standpoint, many open
issues will have to be addressed. 474
The implementation of the debt write-down in the European
Commission proposal also has the potential of increasing funding costs for
financial institutions 475 and could make funding more volatile. 476
Contingent capital securities could also promote greater concentration of
larger banks with the associated anti-competitive results. 477 On the other
hand, the targeted approach could contractually set terms of conversion and
timing that results in greater clarity and more accurate pricing. 478

473
PETER M. WERNER & EDWARD MURRAY, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASSOC. (ISDA),
POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR BANK RECOVERY & RESOLUTION 1, 19–21(Mar. 3, 2011),
available at http://www.isdadocs.org/speeches/pdf/EU_CrossBorderCrisisMgmt_ISDA
Response_Mar11.pdf (ISDA responds to the EU’s “comprehensive EU framework for
troubled and failing banks” and avers the following with regard to the debt write-down
(“bail-in”) proposal: (1) international coordination for debt write-down is essential; (2) the
proposal presents numerous complex issues such as interaction with other proposals
(including Basel III), regulatory issues, and tax issues; (3) the legislative timetable is
“unrealistic” and debt write-down should be tabled until some of these issues have been
resolved because of the need for international coordination and the complex issues
presented. ISDA also contends that the debt write-down proposal would impact derivative
transactions and argues that derivatives exposures “are not an appropriate form of debt to
make subject to the write-down power.” And lastly, ISDA emphasizes the importance of
clarification and certainty with regard to the scope of the debt write-down regime.).
474
Id. at 19–20.
475
ASSOC. OF BRITISH INSURERS (ABI), THE ABI’S RESPONSE: DG INTERNAL MARKET
SERVICES: TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR BANK RECOVERY AND
RESOLUTION 1, 5–6 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.abi.org.uk/Media/Consultation_
Papers/Consultation_Responses.aspx [hereinafter ABI] (ABI notes that regardless of its
members’ positive or negative views, the implementation of the debt write-down will
increase banks’ funding costs. Though the concept may provide greater certainty and
discretion to regulators, it will result in greater uncertainty in the market. Because this
creates greater risk, it will increase costs, and this will “have the unintended effect of
promoting greater concentration into larger banks.” Ultimately, there is concern that the
increased complexity will affect implementation and will not benefit an efficient funding
sector.).
476
DAVID HISCOCK, INT’L CAPITAL MKT. ASSOC. (ICMA), RESPONSE SUBMISSION RE:
EUROPEAN COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER – TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A POSSIBLE
EUROPEAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 1, 2, 4 (Mar. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.icmagroup.org/ICMAGroup/files/c7/c7a2c1bd-f34c-4aaa-b75b-5ab648c
16345.pdf (ICMA expresses concern that the bail-in regime will effectively increase rates for
depositors by encumbering higher quality assets. Banks will be confronted with increased
competition for retail deposits, thus increasing the use of other forms of secured funding. As
a result of increased rates and competition, funding will become less stable. ICMA notes
that one positive aspect of the targeted approach is that investors may precisely express
investment preferences. This creates “a fairer transition to a new regime than simply
imposing bail-in on existing investors.”).
477
ABI, supra note 475, at 6.
478
ASS’N. FOR FIN. MARKETS IN EUR. (AFME), RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
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Financial industry representatives on the national and international
level have criticized the Commission proposal. Some suggest contractual
arrangements for contingent capital should be triggered before a statutory
bail-in is applied. 479 Others oppose the proposed resolution tools involving
full or partial write-downs on the basis that they could threaten covered
bond markets. 480 The key to the proposal seems to be the treatment of
secured debt, derivatives, and covered bonds. 481
In the context of the comprehensive approach, some point to higher
costs of senior debt instruments and their marketability and propose
assurances that would guarantee that the priority claim of capital
instruments remains intact when covering loss. 482 In the context of the

CONSULTATION ON TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR BANK
RECOVERY & RESOLUTION 54–56 (2011), available at http://www.afme.eu/AFME/
What_We_Do/Final%20AFME%20Response.pdf (pointing out the two approaches to debt
write-down proposed by the European Commission: (1) the “targeted” approach, which
“would require banks to hold a fixed amount of ‘bail-in-able’ debt but that would exclude
senior debt from the scope of any write-down;” and (2) the “comprehensive” approach,
which would allow RAs to write-down senior debt. AFME states its members primarily
support the “ease and clarity of the targeted approach, in relation to the comprehensive
approach, although neither option is completely without difficulties.”. The targeted
approach could contractually set terms of conversion and timing resulting in greater clarity
and prices that are a more accurate reflection of risk. AFME also recommends that the
targeted approach be coordinated with Basel III, and ultimately, that the protection provided
be studied. AFME suggests that the comprehensive approach could be available to
regulators as a “last resort” when the targeted approach proves inadequate.). See also DG
Working Document, supra note 10, at 89 (“Targeted approach: An alternative to a
comprehensive approach would be for resolution authorities to require credit institutions to
issue a fixed volume of ‘bail-in able’ debt which, in addition to the power to write off all
equity, and either write off existing subordinated debt or convert it into an equity claim,
could be written down or converted into equity on a statutory trigger.”).
479
SWED. MINISTRY OF FIN ET AL., SWEDISH ANSWERS TO THE DG INTERNAL MARKET AND
SERVICES WORKING DOCUMENT “TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR
BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION” 44 (2011), available at http://www.riksbank.com
/templates/YearList.aspx?id=20368&all=1 (Generally asserts that the untested bail-in regime
should not be relied upon. If the bail-in tool can be shown to be effective, it may be useful
as a wind-down tool. Specifically, it argues that the wind-down tools should include a
statutory bail-in tool to “impose market discipline on unsecured debt holders as they can
impose losses on those creditors.” Further, it suggests that “[c]ontractual bail in instruments
must trigger before a statutory bail in is applied. Regulatory capital instruments must bear
losses before any higher ranking debt.” Such a scheme should still leave “the troubled banks
well capitalized.”).
480
REALKREDITRÅDET (ASS’N OF DANISH MORTG. BANKS), CONSULTATION RESPONSE
CONCERNING TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR BANK RECOVERY AND
RESOLUTION 2, 9 (Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://www.realkreditraadet.dk/Holdninger/
H%C3%B8ringssvar.aspx?M=News&PID=1755&NewsID=543.
481
Id.
482
EUROPEAN ASS’N OF PUBLIC BANKS (EAPB), COMMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN
ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC BANKS ON THE TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK
FOR BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION 8–9, available at http://www.eapb.eu/file?fle=6701.
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comprehensive approach, some point to higher costs of senior debt
instruments and their marketability, and propose assurances that would
guarantee that the rank of these capital instruments in bankruptcy remains
intact and equal ("parri passu") to all other unsecured and unsubordinated
debt. 483
B. Basel Committee Proposal
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (The Basel Committee),
suggested in an initial proposal that internationally active banks be required
to have a clause in their debt instruments that, upon the occurrence of a
triggering event, provides for a mandatory write-off or conversion to
The proposal recommended ensuring the loss
common stock. 484
absorbency of regulatory capital at the point of non-viability. 485 The
proposal also required that such a clause could not conflict with the
respective legal environment of each respective European Union Member
State. 486
After the revision of the European regulatory structure, many
commentators assumed the newly created European Banking Authority
(EBA) would allow national regulators to use their existing Tier 1
definitions. 487 The European Commission, however, proposed a regulation
on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms.488
The proposal in effect harmonized the requirements for Tier I capital. 489
Almost simultaneously, the Basel Committee decided to use retained

483

Id.
Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Proposal to Ensure the Loss Absorbency of
Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non-Viability (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs174.pdf.
485
Id. at 4–5 (“Proposed minimum requirement Scope and post trigger instrument 1. All
non-common Tier 1 instruments and Tier 2 instruments at internationally active banks must
have a clause in their terms and conditions that requires them to be written-off on the
occurrence of the trigger event. 2. Any compensation paid to the instrument holders as a
result of the write-off must be paid immediately in the form of common stock (or its
equivalent in the case of non- joint stock companies). 3. The issuing bank must maintain at
all times all prior authorisation necessary to immediately issue the relevant number of shares
specified in the instrument’s terms and conditions should the trigger event occur. 4. The
trigger event is the earlier of: (1) the decision to make a public sector injection of capital, or
equivalent support, without which the firm would have become non-viable, as determined by
the relevant authority; and (2) a decision that a write-off, without which the firm would
become non-viable, is necessary, as determined by the relevant authority. 5. The issuance of
any new shares as a result of the trigger event must occur prior to any public sector injection
of capital so that the capital provided by the public sector is not diluted.”).
486
Id. at 3.
487
David Enrich, Europe Blinks on Bank Test – Regulators Seen Easing ‘Stress’ Gauge,
Undercutting Effort to Restore Confidence, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2011, at A1, A10.
488
CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, arts. 48a, 49(1)(n), 51(b).
489
Id.
484
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earnings and ordinary shares rather than contingent capital to meet
heightened capital requirements for SIFIs. 490 Thereafter, the European
Commission proposed harmonization in the context of Tier 1 capital,
allowing convertible instrument capital as Tier 1 capital. 491 The proposal
would permit contingent capital securities as an “Additional Tier 1
instrument.” 492 This could be a first step toward a basic framework for
harmonized contingent capital standards. This framework could enable
European Union Member States to provide national regulatory guidance on
contingent capital or allow private ordering of contingent capital designs. 493
C. Swiss Approach
The Swiss approach to contingent capital distinguishes between high
and low triggers for contingent capital securities (CCS) and allocates a
maximum of 9 percent of the total core capital to CCS with predefined
triggers. 494 The Swiss Act on Banks and Savings Banks 495 defines “criteria
and determination of systemic importance” 496 in Article 8 before defining
“convertible capital” in Article 13. 497
The Swiss approach in Article 13 could perhaps become a model for
other European legislators and perhaps even the U.S. legislator. It gives the
490
Louis Meera, Europeans Lose Out to U.S. with Basel Committee’s Contingent Capital
Vote, BLOOMBERG, June 27, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-26/baselcommittee-decision-on-contingent-capital-backs-u-s-stance.html (noting that this was a
victory for U.S. regulators over their European counterparts and quoting Karen Shaw Petrou,
managing partner of Washington-based Federal Financial Analytics Inc., a bank consulting
firm: “Europeans were pushing for a mix of common equity and contingent capital and they
lost at a global level.”).
491
CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, art. 49(1)(n) (the proposed regulation defines one
form of “Additional Tier 1 instruments” as a capital instrument in which “the provisions
governing the instruments require the principal amount of the instrument to be written down,
or the instruments to be converted to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, upon the
occurrence of a trigger event.”). Additional Tier 1 capital is defined in the proposed
regulation. See CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, art. 49(1)(n).
492
CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, arts. 48a, 49(1)(n), 51(b).
493
On the calibration of market mechanisms, private ordering, and mandatory rules see
Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in
Corporate Governance, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 101 (2012) [hereinafter
Kaal Corporate Governance]; see also Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive
Compensation (on file with author) [hereinafter Kaal Executive Compensation] (on the use
of contingent capital for dynamic regulation of financial institutions).
494
SWISS CONFEDERATION, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS FOR LIMITING
THE ECONOMIC RISKS POSED BY LARGE COMPANIES 59–60 (2010), available at
http://www.sif.admin.ch/dokumentation/00514/00519/00592/index.html?lang=en.
495
BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN [BANKG] [FEDERAL LAW ON
BANKS, SAVING AND LOANS] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952 (Switz.), available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf (as of Mar. 1, 2012).
496
Id. art. 8.
497
Id. art. 13.
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Board of Directors of systemically important banks 498 the authority to issue
“mandatory convertible bonds within the scope of the provisions of the
articles of incorporation” 499 but requires disclosure of the “conversiontriggering event.” 500 It also envisions the use of tranches and multiple
trigger events. 501
The Swiss Banking Act requires that CCS are offered to shareholders
and participation certificate holders in proportion to their then current
holdings. 502 If, however, the market environment requires it or if CCS are
issued at a discount to facilitate a complete placement, a shareholders’
meeting may authorize the issuance of CCS to non-shareholders. 503 If these
requirements are fulfilled, the shareholders’ meeting of the respective SIFI
would in effect allow the exclusion of “subscription rights of the
shareholders and participation certificate holders.” 504
D. The English Proposals
In the United Kingdom, Lloyds Bank was the first bank to issue
contingent capital securities in 2010.505 The issuance, through a non-U.S.
bond-exchange offer, raised £8.5 billion of contingent core Tier 1 and core
498
Id. art.7(2) (“The purpose of the provisions of this section, in concert with the
generally applicable statutory banking regulations, is to reduce further the risks posed by
systemically important banks to the stability of the Swiss financial system, to ensure the
continuation of economically vital functions and to avoid government bail-out measures.”).
Given the structure of the BankG, the use of contingent capital with sequential triggers
seems to be possible in the Swiss model, although certain limitations in the Swiss model
might require adjustments for contingent capital with sequential triggers. See Wulf A. Kaal
& Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers, 49 San Diego. L. Rev.
221 (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter Kaal & Henkel Sequential].
499
Id. art. 13(3).
500
Id. art. 13(5).
501
Id. art. 13(3)(b) (“The trigger event or, in the case of tranches, the trigger events.”).
502
BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN [BANKG] [FEDERAL LAW ON
BANKS, SAVING AND LOANS] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952, art. 13(4) (Switz.), available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/9/952.0.de.pdf (as of Mar. 1, 2012).
503
Id.
504
Id. English translation of an earlier version of the Swiss Banking Act at art. 12(2) (on
file with authors) (“The Board of Directors can cancel the subscription rights of shareholders
or participation certificate holders for good cause, particularly if this helps with the rapid and
smooth placement of shares or participation certificates.”). See also art. 13(1) (“The General
Meeting can decide on a contingent increase in the share or participation capital by
stipulating in the articles of incorporation that the debt securities arising from mandatory
convertible bonds are converted into shares or participation certificates if the trigger event
occurs.”). See also FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS FOR LIMITING THE
ECONOMIC RISKS POSED BY LARGE COMPANIES 67–68 (Sept. 30, 2010), available at
http://www.sif.admin.ch/dokumentation/00522/00715/index.html?lang=en&___=
(“The Board of Directors can exclude or limit the former shareholders’ pre-emptive
subscription rights for good cause.”).
505
von Furstenberg, supra note 283, at 10.
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Tier 1 notes. 506 As a result of investor demand for the exchange offer
exceeding $2.7 billion, which was almost three times the amount on offer,
Lloyds issued the maximum of $986 million of enhanced capital notes. 507
The enhanced capital notes were designed to convert into equity in case
Lloyds’ core Tier 1 capital ratio fell below 5 percent. 508 Barclays, a bank
based in the United Kingdom, has also contemplated the issuance of
contingent capital securities to the public. 509 Barclays has already issued
contingent capital to its executives but with minimal governance
improvements. 510
Other banks in the United Kingdom are considering the issuance of
contingent capital if and when regulatory guidance is provided. 511 While
insolvency law in the United Kingdom already allows for so-called
“Company Voluntary Arrangements,” an instrument comparable to
traditional debt-equity swaps, 512 the Bank of England did propose
precautionary and non-viability contingent capital. 513 Many open questions
still need to be addressed in the context of contingent capital instruments. 514
E. German Draft Amendments to the Corporation Act
While German law does not provide per se for contingent capital
securities, a debt-equity swap between creditors and financial institutions in
reorganization is already an integral part of the German Financial Institution
Reorganization Act. 515 Unlike contingent capital securities, however, a
debt-equity swap requires creditors’ consent under the German Law. 516 The
German Ministry of Justice seems to have recognized this as a shortcoming
506
Kathy Sandler & Margot Patrick, Lloyds Raises $14 Billion in Bond Exchange, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 24, 2009, at C2.
507
UPDATE 1-Lloyds gets Strong Demand for U.S. Bond Exchange, REUTERS, Dec. 8
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/08/lloyds-idUSGEE5B70QB20091208.
508
Id.
509
Jenkins, supra note 282. Another bank that has issued contingent capital is the Dutch
Rabobank.
510
See Kaal Executive Compensation, supra note 493.
511
See Kaal Corporate Governance, supra note 493.
512
See, e.g., Banking Act, 2009, c. 1, §§ 113, 154 (U.K.). See also Insolvency Act, 1986,
c. 45 (U.K.).
513
BANK OF ENG., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 56 (2010), available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2010/fsrfull1012.pdf (suggesting that
contingent capital will result in higher loss-absorbency and proposing two types of
contingent capital: precautionary and non-viability).
514
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT: CONSULTATION ON REFORM
OPTIONS 180–83 (2011) (U.K.), available at http://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/
htcdn/Interim-Report-110411.pdf (questioning who would buy contingent capital and the
“possible dynamic effects” on banks “at or near to the trigger point”).
515
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorgG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, § 9(1) (Ger.).
516
Id.

250

Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring
32:191 (2012)

and proposed amending the German Corporation Act. 517 The proposed
amendments seem to facilitate the implementation of contingent capital and
would provide a statutory basis for the issuance of contingent capital
securities in Germany. 518 Implementing the amendments would require
substantial changes in other areas of German law. 519 This may not be easily
achieved unless required under European Union law and internationally
recognized. The implementation of the amendments to the German
Corporation Act could, to a large extent, also depend on the work of the
Basel Committee and its use of contingent capital in Basel III. 520
V. CONTINGENT CAPITAL DESIGN—TRIGGERING EVENT
The efficient calibration of triggering events is central to the design of
contingent capital. The optimal design for a trigger event that converts debt
into equity is unclear. 521 Scholars discuss various trigger events that may

517

Referentenentwurf des Bundesministeriums der Justiz, Gesetz zur Änderung des
Aktiengesetzes, Nov. 11, 2010 (Ger.), available at http://www.der-betrieb.de/content/
pdfft,0,395158; see also Hans Diekmann, Andre Nolting, Aktienrechtsnovelle 2011, Neue
Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 6, 8–9 (2011); Karsten Müller-Eising,
Aktienrechtsnovelle 2011 – Änderungen zur Vorzugsaktie und zum bedingten Kapital für
Wandelanleihen, Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsrecht (GWR) 591, 593 (2010);
Handelsrechtsausschuss
des
Deutschen
Anwaltsvereins
Stellungnahme
zum
Referentenentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Aktiengesetzes (Aktienrechtsnovelle
2011), Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 217, 220 (2011).
518
The reform of the German Corporation Act is centered around Sections 192, 194, and
221 AktG. Under prior German Law, the instrument of “Mandatory Convertible Bonds”
(“Pflichtwandelschuldverschreibung”) had already been recognized.
519
Steffen Schneider & Markus Söhnchen, Rettung von Kreditinstituten in der Krise
durch Contingent Convertible Bonds - Pflichtwandelschuldverschreibungen für Banken
(“CoCo-Bonds”), FORUM-INSTITUT FÜR MANAGEMENT GMBH, available at
http://www.forum-institut.de/fileadmin/data/Bereich_3/Rettung_von_Finanzinstituten_in_
der_Krise.pdf.
Id. (opining that the new Act would require a change of the
Kreditwesengesetz [Banking Act], the Limited Act, the Corporation Act, the Insolvency Act,
and the Schuldverschreibungsgesetzes.).
520
Id. See also discussion supra Part IV.B. on Basel Committees decision not to
integrate contingent capital.
521
Sundaresan & Wang, supra note 451 (recognizing that a value transfer between equity
and contingent capital “disturbs equilibrium by moving the stock price up or down,
depending on the conversion ratio specified,” and that the proposals typically ensure that
there is no value transfer at maturity, but do not ensure there is no transfer before maturity.
Because the value transfer will not always push the stock price across the trigger, there are
two possible scenarios (equilibria): (1) “all investors believe conversion will not happen,
leading stock price to stay above the trigger,” and (2) “all investors believe conversion will
happen, leading stock price to hit the trigger.” Sundaresan and Wang aver that “[s]ince two
prices are possible whenever firm value drops to [a] certain level, by combining these dual
equilibria around trigger at different times in the future, numerous expected equity values are
possible even well before conversion.”). See Coffee, supra note 562; FLANNERY, supra note
24; McDonald, supra note 451; see also Darrell Duffie, Contractual Methods for Out-OfCourt Restructuring of Systematically Important Financial Institutions 1, 4 (Nov. 9, 2009)
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be categorized as follows: (1) transactional triggers, (2) automatic triggers,
(3) statutory triggers, and (4) regulatory triggers. Constituents favor trigger
designs in accordance with their own utility preferences. For instance,
interest groups representing the banking industry seem to favor
transactional triggers that are privately negotiated, 522 subjective, and
flexible. 523 Some authors favor automatic triggers that convert debt into
equity when a certain stock price, index value, CDS spread, capital ratio, or
other trigger is reached. 524 Others, including the Basel Committee, prefer
statutory triggers that allow for regulatory discretion. 525 Lastly, regulatory
(Preliminary Draft: Submission Requested by the U.S. Treasury Working Group on Bank
Capital), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/06Ending
GovernmentBailoutsAsWeKnowThemDuffie.pdf (focusing on possible triggers of Distress Contingent Convertible Bonds/Debt (essentially CCS). If the trigger is an accounting capital
ratio, it may not be able to capture the true financial condition of the bank because of
accounting failures. The ratio of tangible common equity (TCE) to tangible assets may be
more effective because it excludes the “relatively useless assets during a solvency crisis.” If
the trigger is determined by market value, the impact of a short seller speculative attack
could be mitigated by using a trailing average share price (e.g., the preceding 20 days). To
eliminate a “bank run,” the trigger should be set to convert debt into equity before a liquidity
crisis begins. Duffie also discusses mandatory rights offerings.).
522
Monroe, supra note 452, at 4 (“Contingent capital instruments should be based on
terms and conditions, including triggering events, negotiated by banks and their investors.
To do otherwise would be to require banks to issue securities for which no viable market
exists at reasonable prices, thereby forcing banks to offer extraordinary return to compensate
investors for extraordinary risk. This would cause a damaging hit to banks’ profitability and,
therefore, to their ability to attract other forms of capital.”).
523
Swedish Ministry of Finance, supra note 479, (favoring contractual trigger and
arguing contractual trigger should come before statutory trigger); Monroe, supra note 452, at
4–5 (favoring negotiated terms of contingent capital: “A regulatory trigger would be very
subjective, allowing for a high degree of latitude by supervisory authorities without
reference to specified criteria. Experience teaches that under political pressure regulators
could be just as prone to forebear as they would be to exercise such a trigger. Regulatory
triggers may also preclude the ability of a bank to “cure” a trigger event, a common feature
of other capital instruments.”).
524
Coffee, supra note 26, at 831; Flannery, supra note 24, at 11–12; Mark J. Flannery,
No Pain, No Gain? Effecting Market Discipline via “Reverse Convertible Debentures” 30
(Nov. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/f
lannery/No%20Pain,%20No%20Gain.pdf [hereinafter Flannery No Pain] (“Frequent trigger
evaluations eliminate moral hazard incentives and expose the RCD to surprisingly low
default risk.”); McDonald, supra note 451, at 2 (proposing “a form of contingent capital for
financial institutions that converts from debt to equity if two conditions are met: the firm’s
stock price is at or below a trigger value and the value of a financial institutions index is also
at or below a trigger value.”); Paul Glasserman & Behzad Nouri, Contingent Capital with a
Capital-Ratio Trigger (Aug. 31, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669686
(analyzing the case of contingent capital with a capital-ratio trigger and partial and on-going
conversion).
525
See, GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL MKTS. INST., CONTINGENT CAPITAL: POSSIBILITIES,
PROMISES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 4 (2011), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/ourthinking/global-economic-outlook/global-econ-outlook-pdfs/contigent-capital.pdf
[hereinafter Goldman Sachs]. See also SWEDISH MINISTRY OF FINANCE, THE RIKSBANK, THE

252

Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring
32:191 (2012)

triggers converting debt into equity can be precipitated by, for instance, the
results of a bank stress test. This might occur when a financial institution
decides to write off a portion of its assets or when a regulator determines
that a financial institution is not financially viable without a public sector
injection of equity capital. 526 Some authors suggest several and often
interrelated triggering events. 527 Contingent capital with sequential triggers
can combine elements from various trigger designs. 528
A. Trigger Events – Uncertainty – Market Development
Given the range of public sector injections into struggling financial
institutions during the financial crisis, the European Commission suggests
that a mandatory minimum issuance of contingent capital could range from
4 to 19 percent of risk-weighted assets. 529 Others believe the range of
mandatory contingent capital issuance should approach between 4 and 8
percent of risk-weighted assets. 530 Mandatory issuance of contingent
capital does not guarantee that a viable market in contingent capital
securities will develop. The nascent market in European contingent capital
securities developed through the involvement of hedge funds and other
private market participants. 531 The expansion of an international market in
contingent capital securities will depend on many factors, including perhaps

SWEDISH FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY & THE SWEDISH NATIONAL DEBT OFFICE,
SWEDISH ANSWERS TO THE DG INTERNAL MARKET AND SERVICES WORKING DOCUMENT
“TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR BANK RECOVERY AND
RESOLUTION” 1, 43 (March 3, 2011), available at http://www.riksbank.com/templates/
YearList.aspx?id=20368&all=1 (arguing that the wind-down tools should include a statutory
bail-in tool.); Ceyla Pazarbasioglu et al., Contingent Capital: Economic Rationale and
Design Features, IMF Staff Discussion Note 18 (January 25, 2011), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn 1101.pdf (advocating a statutory bail-in
regime as opposed to contingent capital); FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, KEY ATTRIBUTES OF
EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION REGIMES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1, 9-10 (OCTOBER 2011),
available at http://www.financial stabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104cc.pdf (among
other suggestions, arguing in favor of “apply[ing] one or a combination of resolution powers,
with resolution actions being either combined or applied sequentially.”).
526
FLANNERY, supra note 24 (recommending that conversion of debt security be tied to a
decline in the bank’s equity ratio); BIS III, supra note 48, at 7.
527
FLANNERY, supra note 24; Flannery No Pain, supra note 524; McDonald, supra note
451, at 2 (proposing “a form of contingent capital for financial institutions that converts from
debt to equity if two conditions are met: the firm’s stock price is at or below a trigger value
and the value of a financial institutions index is also at or below a trigger value.”);
Glasserman & Nouri, supra note 524 (analyzing the case of contingent capital with a capitalratio trigger and partial and on-going conversion).
528
Kaal & Henkel Sequential, supra note 498.
529
DG Working Document, supra note 10, Annex, n. 24.
530
Goldman Sachs, supra note 525.
531
See Kaal Corporate Governance, supra note 493.
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a level of convergence in CCS designs and issuance volumes. 532
Developing a critical mass for the market in contingent capital securities
could require banks and other financial institutions to purchase their
competitors’ contingent capital securities. 533 That could raise ethical,
antitrust, and incentive concerns. 534

The interplay between the structuring of trigger events, the resulting
level of uncertainty for market participants, and the development of a
market in CCS has not been systematically studied. Graph 1 shows a
possible inverse relationship between the volume of CCS issuance and risk
or a higher interest rate as a proxy for risk taking. Line 1 shows that, as the
uncertainty generated by the trigger designs increases, the volume of CCS
could decrease. Line 2 suggests that risk and the interest rates of CCS
(before conversion) will increase with the level of uncertainty in the trigger
design promulgated by policy makers and legislators.
A large variety of trigger designs and a combination of trigger designs
is possible. Graph 1 categorizes trigger designs into institution specific and
systemic. Institution specific triggers may be transactional or automatic.
Systemic triggers can be statutory or regulatory. A regulatory systemic
trigger may generate the highest degree of uncertainty, as suggested in
532
533
534
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Graph 1. This can be a trigger that converts CCS into equity upon, for
instance, a regulator’s decision that additional capital is needed.535
Regulatory triggers can also be based on stress tests, or the determination
that the respective bank is not viable without a public sector injection of
capital or a write-off. 536 A statutory systemic trigger is a trigger that by law
converts CCS to equity when, for instance, a legally defined mortgage
delinquency rate is reached. This would not provide regulators with
discretion. Instead, statutory systemic triggers may be based on somewhat
more objective measures, such as a delinquency rate, defined by law. The
lack of regulatory discretion in the statutory systemic trigger would
presumably give market participants more certainty as to possible trigger
scenarios than a regulatory systemic trigger.
In this model, institution specific triggers would grant the most
certainty to market participants. An automatic institution-specific trigger
could be based on reaching a certain predefined threshold in the share price,
credit default swap spreads, or debt equity ratios. 537 Assuming that SIFIs
would be required to disclose all CCS contracts with counterparties,
including any triggering events therein, transactional institution-specific
triggers may involve the lowest level of uncertainty for market participants.
B. Timing Trigger Events
The timing of triggering events is a crucial element in the design of
contingent capital securities. If conversion is triggered too early without a
real need for an equity capital injection (and additional voting
shareholders), the impact of the equity capital injection may have dissipated
and may no longer be available when actually needed. If conversion from
debt to equity is triggered too late, the financial institution may already be
in the resolution stage and conversion at that stage would not supply the
company with sufficient equity to turn the company around. It is also
unclear if contingent capital securities should be converted incrementally to
soften the negative effect an early or late conversion may have. Jack Coffee
prefers an incremental conversion in a series of steps. 538 Others argue
535

See, e.g., Flannery No Pain, supra note 524, at 182–87 (supporting conversion of debt
security tied to decline in bank’s equity ratio). Contra McDonald, supra note 451, at 3
(rejecting the use of accounting figures in the trigger or conversion formulas); Coffee, supra
note 26, at 831 (arguing against the use of account numbers in triggers).
536
BIS III, supra note 48.
537
Some have argued that these market based triggers could be subject to manipulation,
see Ceyla Pazarbasioglu et al., Contingent Capital: Economic Rationale and Design
Features, IMF Staff Staff Discussion Note (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.imf.org
/external/ pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1101.pdf.
538
Coffee, supra note 26, at 830 (arguing for incremental conversion in a series of steps
because that incremental conversion enables an early trigger for conversion. He uses the
following example: “[A]n incremental design might hypothetically convert 25% of the
convertible bonds on a 25% stock price decline from the stock price on the date of the
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contingent capital provisions should permit “carefully designed partial or
temporary write-downs within reasonable bounds.” 539
C. Dual Triggers in Going and Gone Concern
Scholars have previously proposed models for contingent capital that
involve dual triggers. McDonald suggests a model for contingent capital
where debt converts to equity if both (1) “the firm’s stock price is at or
below a trigger value,” and (2) “the value of a financial institution’s index is
also at or below a trigger value.” 540 McDonald provides an example of
contingent capital with dual triggers and compares this model with other
alternatives. McDonald also discusses various issues related to evaluating
contingent capital proposals including the effect of market manipulation,
capital errors, 541 and problems with reliance on accounting measures. A
central strength of the dual trigger proposals is their reliance on market
prices. A major disadvantage is the index trigger, which could potentially
create incentives to manipulate the index or to try to force an entity into
bankruptcy. 542 However, McDonald’s dual-price trigger may act like a
single-price trigger in times of stress. Outside of a crisis scenario, the dualprice trigger contingent capital acts more like standard subordinated debt.543
Sequential triggers, on the other hand, may allow the conversion of

bonds’ issuance; another 25% might convert on a further 25% decline; and the balance
would convert if the stock price fell 75% (or more) from the original price.”).
539
Monroe, supra note 452, at 4.
540
McDonald, supra note 451, Abstract.
541
Such as contingent capital converting into equity when not required and contingent
capital failing to convert into equity when it is required.
542
McDonald, supra note 451, at 13 (“The difference between the converted and
unconverted bond is greatest when the bond is close to maturity and the payment of par is a
few days away. This is clearly a case where traders might try to manipulate the index to
avoid conversion [. . . .] Under some circumstances bondholders could have an incentive to
try to force the institution into bankruptcy before conversion can occur. Suppose the share
price is very low but the index price is above the trigger. Bond-holders may believe that they
will receive a greater percentage of principal as subordinated bondholders in bankruptcy as
opposed to the value of shares they would receive in default.”). See also Mark J. Flannery,
Stabilizing Large Financial Institutions with Contingent Capital Certificates 18-19 (2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1485689 (“A market-valued
trigger might attract market manipulation. A speculator could purchase some CCC, short the
stock, and receive under-valued shares when the conversion trigger was tripped. If short
sales could force a solvent firm’s share price to zero, CCC might destabilize financial firms
rather than stabilizing them.”).
543
George Pennacchi, A Structural Model of Contingent Bank Capital, supra note 451, at
12 (arguing that “dual-price trigger contingent capital acts like single-price trigger
contingent capital in a crisis but acts like standard subordinated debt in a non-crisis.”). See
also George Pennacchi, A Structural Model of Contingent Bank Capital, supra note451, at
28 (concluding that “yields on dual-price trigger contingent capital fall between those of
comparable single-price trigger contingent capital and subordinated debt”).
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contingent capital into equity in a going and gone concern scenario.544
Given that the European Commission structures its resolution regime into
going and gone concern with a significant role for contingent capital in both
going and gone concern, 545 sequential triggers in going and gone concern
could help improve incentives for decision makers in the financial
institutions and policy makers. 546 Sequential triggers within the European
Commission’s targeted and comprehensive approach 547 could take various
forms. The first trigger converting contingent capital securities into equity
could be based on various models that had previously been discussed in the
literature. 548
If the financial health of the financial institution does not return up to a
predefined threshold, the voting rights of such common stock (as a result of
conversion from debt into equity) could be changed to give the former
holder of contingent capital securities more influence in the resolution
phase of the financial institution. 549 This has several benefits. Given the
risk that policy makers may not structure the trigger appropriately, the
negative effects of inadequate or untimely conversion of debt into equity at
a time when the company requires a capital injection could be cushioned
with a second trigger before the reorganization or resolution of the
company. 550 A second trigger pre-reorganization of the entity could add an
element of prudential regulation because it would apply only to a small
portion of SIFIs rather than all internationally active banks. It would only
come into effect if the first trigger was unsuccessful, and it would merely
increase the dilution of shareholder voting rights as a remedy of last resort
before bankruptcy. 551 The interplay of conversion from debt to equity
before resolution as a preventative act and the use of a second trigger in the
resolution stage would have to be carefully calibrated. More research is
needed to determine the best incentive structure for contingent capital
holders and management. 552

544

Kaal & Henkel Sequential, supra note 498.
DG Working Document, supra note 10, at Annex I.
546
See Kaal & Henkel Sequential, supra note 498 (proposing sequential triggers where
the first trigger would be a preventative tool while the second trigger before the resolution
phase would provide additional voting rights for contingent capital holders to secure success
of the first trigger and set appropriate incentives for shareholder and management).
547
Id.
548
See generally Coffee, supra note 26.
549
Kaal & Henkel Sequential, supra note 498.
550
Id.
551
Id.
552
See further Kaal Executive Compensation, supra note 493.
545
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VI. CONTINGENT CAPITAL AS A PREVENTATIVE TOOL IN
EUROPEAN UNION BANK RESTRUCTURING
Proposals on bank restructuring by the European Commission, 553 the
Basel Committee, 554 and the Financial Stability Board 555 focus on statutory
debt write-down or bail-inables within resolution. Although the potential of
contingent capital as a preventative tool is widely recognized, 556 the
European Commission and national legislators have not yet adopted
contingent capital as a mandatory part of capital requirements for financial
institutions.
Instead the European Commission merely favors the
recognition of contingent capital as Tier 1 common equity, leaving the
implementation of contingent capital to the markets and the discretion of
national legislators. 557
For instance, the Swiss approach to contingent capital stops short of
making the issuance of contingent capital a mandatory requirement for
Swiss SIFIs. The Swiss Banking Act requires Swiss SIFIs to be prepared
for future crises 558 but leaves it up to management to determine if such
preparation should entail the issuance of contingent capital or raising
additional capital. 559 In practice, however, issuing contingent capital
securities could be less expensive than raising additional Tier 1 capital.
With total Swiss capital requirements at 19 % of risk weighted assets, well
beyond the capital requirements under Basel III, Swiss SIFIs could be well
advised to issue contingent capital securities. The Swiss Banking Act
requires a regular review of its provisions to ensure comparability with
international standards. 560
At the European level, the European Union bank resolution regime
could be further enhanced with contingent capital. The European bank
resolution regime could work more effectively and more comprehensively

553

See DG Working Document, supra note 10.
See Bank for Int’l Settlements [BIS], Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision,
Consultative Document: Global Systemically Important Banks: Assessment Methodology
and the Additional Loss Absorbency Requirement (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs201.pdf.
555
See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 71.
556
See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 27; see also DG Working Document, supra note
10; see CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10; see CRD IV Directive, supra note 10.
557
See. e.g., CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10, arts. 48a, 49(1)(n), & 51(b).
558
BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN [BANKG] [FEDERAL LAW ON
BANKS, SAVING AND LOANS] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952, art. 9 (Switz.), available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2011/7487.pdf.
559
See Swiss Banking Act, SR 952.0 art. 11, 14
560
The Swiss Banking Act specifically requires a regular review of all provisions after
the implementation of the initial amendments. The first review is scheduled, at the latest,
three years after the implementation, and followed by a two-year interval thereafter. The
goal of the review is a comparison with international standards in other countries. See id.
art. 52.
554
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with contingent capital as a preventative tool. Contingent capital could play
an important role in an effective resolution regime, it could provide
additional loss absorbing capital before any regulatory intervention is
necessary, and contingent capital could be a reliable source of common
equity. 561 This is of particular significance if SIFIs are mandated to
organize in a manner that ensures the continuous operation of their
systemically important sectors. 562
Contingent capital could work well within the European Commission
proposal on bank resolution. It could be part of bank capital requirements.
Alternatively, contingent capital could become part of resolution and
recovery plans prior to financial institutions entering the vicinity of
bankruptcy. The issuance of contingent capital could take place at the
earliest possible stage, when the institution is still sound on a microprudential basis. 563 It could also be part of mandated recapitalizations if
financial institutions are unable to pass stress tests. 564 Conversion of CCS
from debt to equity should take place when problems are first detected but
before early intervention powers of regulatory authorities are triggered. 565
Contingent capital may help SIFIs to reorganize without the
involvement of courts and regulators. Compared to preferred stock, Tier 2
debt, and other subordinated debt, contingent capital can help firms to
recover from distress without going into resolution. 566 It could provide a
soft-landing similar to reorganization as a going concern through the debtor
in possession under Chapter 11. 567 The restructuring of a financial
561

Kaal & Henkel Sequential, supra note 546.
See, e.g., BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN [BANKG] [FEDERAL
LAW ON BANKS, SAVING AND LOANS] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952, art. 9, ¶ 2(a)(2) (Switz.) (“2.
Systemically important banks must specifically: (a) dispose of common equity, which will
namely: . . . 2. Contribute substantially to the continuing operation of all systemically
relevant functions in case of impending insolvency.”); id. art. 9, ¶ 2(d) (“2. Systemically
important banks must specifically: . . . (d) provide for a resolution plan that can be
implemented immediately and in case of impending insolvency ensures the continuing
operation of all systemically relevant functions. The resolution plan must address structural,
infrastructural, management and control concerns, and shall ensure group internal capital
flow and liquidity.”); id. at art. 10, ¶ 10(2) (“2. The systemically important bank shall prove
that it fulfills the specific requirements of art. 2, subsection 2(d) and is able to continue the
operation of its systemically important functions in case of impending insolvency. If the
bank cannot provide this proof, FINMA shall order the implementation of all appropriate
measures.”) (translations provided by the authors).
563
John C. Coffee, supra note 26, at 831 (providing a rationale for why an “early and
incremental conversion” may be advantageous).
564
See, e.g., Brooke Masters, Peggy Hollinger & Alex Barker, EU to Speed
Recapitalization of Smaller Banks, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/0/49d6240e-e527-11e0-bdb8-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1bBppLalv.
565
Specific trigger designs may require additional research, Member State consensus,
and market development. See discussion supra Part V.
566
FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 75, at 12; see supra text accompanying note 555.
567
Kaal & Henkel Sequential, supra note 546 (elaborating on the use of contingent
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institution would be initiated on a voluntary basis by the institution itself
and without any public involvement. Contingent capital would provide
additional downside protection.
Contingent capital as a preventative tool would not impede the
statutory core power or debt write-down tool of bail-inables within
resolution. If the contractual debt write-down and conversion at an early
stage does not achieve the desired result, regulatory authorities would not
be prevented from intervening and initiating a write-down or haircut aimed
at all shareholders, debt investors, and other private parties involved.
VII. CONVERGENCE
Without a degree of similarity and convergence in bank resolution and
contingent capital rules, regulatory arbitrage could have an adverse effect
on establishing contingent capital as an integral part of financial markets.
Although many proposals on contingent capital are based on similar ideas, a
coherent trend toward convergence of contingent capital standards seems
still elusive. This could partially be due to a first mover problem. Single
jurisdictions could be hesitant to implement contingent capital requirements
without first knowing how other jurisdictions and financial institutions that
compete with their home institutions may structure their contingent capital
rules.
The European Commission Regulation Proposal which defines Tier 1
capital 568 could be a first step toward setting up a basic framework for
harmonized contingent capital standards. While the Commission proposal
only harmonizes the definition of Tier 1 capital, Member States are free to
set up rules for contingent capital or leave contingent capital designs up to
private ordering. 569 The European Commission Regulation Proposal and its
harmonization of the Tier I capital definition could fill a void left by the
Basel Committee. The Basel Committee rejected requests from EU
Member States to use contingent capital to satisfy the new capital buffer
requirements under Basel III. 570 Instead, the Basel Committee decided to
require SIFIs to use retained earnings and ordinary shares to meet
heightened capital requirements. 571 While this approach will not fully

capital as a pre-reorganization tool).
568
CRD IV Regulation, supra note 10.
569
For a discussion on the benefits of private ordering and the calibration of market
mechanisms, private ordering, and mandatory rules see Kaal, Corporate Governance, supra
note 493; see also Kaal, Executive Compensation, supra note 493 (discussing the use of
contingent capital for dynamic regulation of financial institutions).
570
Meera, supra note 490.
571
Id. (noting that this was a victory for U.S. regulators over their European counterparts
and quoting Karen Shaw Petrou, managing partner of Federal Financial Analytics Inc., a
Washington-based, bank consulting firm: “Europeans were pushing for a mix of common
equity and contingent capital and they lost at a global level.”).
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replace a requirement under Basel III to use contingent capital to satisfy a
new capital buffer, it leaves enough flexibility for counterparties and the
legislators in the respective EU Member States to implement contingent
capital.
Despite an active discourse on harmonization and convergence of
contingent capital criteria in Europe, the debate in the United States on the
use of contingent capital in bank restructuring is just in the beginning
stages. 572 Although the Dodd Frank Act authorizes the use of contingent
capital, its design features and the extent of its potential applications are
unclear. 573 The Federal Reserve Board, through Section 165(b)(1)(B) of the
Dodd-Frank Act, can impose “a contingent capital requirement” on both
“nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors” and
certain “bank holding companies.” 574 However, this authority is contingent
on the outcome of a study on the feasibility of contingent capital. 575 The
SEC study, mandated by Section 115 (c) of the Dodd-Frank Act, requires
an evaluation of the international competitiveness of United States
companies that implement contingent capital. 576
Single jurisdictions may be deterred from implementing contingent
capital requirements without knowing or being able to anticipate how other
jurisdictions will structure their contingent capital rules. This could be a
special concern because legislators may want to structure contingent capital
rules in a way that enables their national financial institutions to compete
with other international financial institutions that would be subject to the
572

Coffee, supra note 26, at 846.
Kaal & Henkel Sequential, supra note 498.
574
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
575
Id. § 165(c)(1) (“CONTINGENT CAPITAL.— (1) IN GENERAL.— Subsequent to
submission by the Council of a report to Congress under section 115(c), the Board of
Governors may issue regulations that require each nonbank financial company supervised by
the Board of Governors and bank holding companies described in subsection . . .”). The
content of the study is described in Section 115 (c) of the Dodd-Frank Act. (“(c)
CONTINGENT CAPITAL.— (1) STUDY REQUIRED.—The Council shall conduct a
study of the feasibility, benefits, costs, and structure of a contingent capital requirement for
nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors and bank holding
companies described in subsection (a), which study shall include— (A) an evaluation of the
degree to which such requirement would enhance the safety and soundness of companies
subject to the requirement, promote the financial stability of the United States, and reduce
risks to United States tax- payers; (B) an evaluation of the characteristics and amounts of
contingent capital that should be required; (C) an analysis of potential prudential standards
that should be used to determine whether the contingent capital of a company would be
converted to equity in times of financial stress; (D) an evaluation of the costs to companies,
the effects on the structure and operation of credit and other financial markets, and other
economic effects of requiring contingent capital; (E) an evaluation of the effects of such
requirement on the international competitiveness of companies subject to the requirement
and the prospects for international coordination in establishing such requirement; and (F)
recommendations for implementing regulations.”).
576
Id. § 115 (c)(1)(D)–(E).
573
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contingent capital rules in their home state. Without a certain level of
convergence in contingent capital rules, regulatory arbitrage could have an
adverse effect on establishing contingent capital as an integral part of
financial markets.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Disparate bank resolution and restructuring regimes in Europe and the
United States could face many challenges in future crises. Contingent
capital may offer a viable and efficient alternative for the prevention of
bank failure and facilitates the efficient restructuring and resolution of
failing financial institutions. Similar to a Chapter 11 reorganization
procedure, contingent capital could offer a soft landing for banks in distress
and may be specifically well suited for systemically important financial
institutions. The European Commission has recognized the possible role
contingent capital could play for the European banking sector. Contingent
capital may also enhance and harmonize disparate resolution regimes
throughout the European Union and could help ensure the competitiveness
of the financial sector. The exact calibration of design features is crucial for
the establishment of a future market in contingent capital securities. The
uncertainties involved in the trigger mechanisms may require a reevaluation
of trigger designs currently under consideration. Given the European
initiatives on contingent capital and the nascent market in European
contingent capital securities, the Board of Governors of the United States
Federal Reserve would be well advised to consider implementing
contingent capital standards. Contingent capital securities could help
ensure the future competitiveness of financial institutions in the United
States.
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